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Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment:
A Practical Approach to the Excessive




After forty-nine years working the sugar plantations in Hawai'i, Joseph
Lopes retired with his wife Frances in a modest home they had managed to
buy with the fieldwork earnings.' Their adult, mentally disabled son Thomas
lived with them.2 The Pittsburgh Press recounted their story:
For a while, Thomas grew marijuana in the back yard-and
threatened to kill himself every time his parents tried to cut it
down. In 1987, the police caught Thomas, then 28. He pleaded
guilty, got probation for his first offense and was ordered to see a
psychologist once a week. He has, and never again has grown
dope or been arrested. The family thought the episode was behind
them. But [four years later], a detective scouring old arrest
records for forfeiture opportunities realized the Lopes house could
be taken away because they had admitted they knew about the
marijuana.3
Federal drug agents subsequently paid Joseph and Frances Lopes a visit and
claimed their home for the U.S. government.4 The police stood to "make a
bundle" on the house, as law enforcement was entitled to keep forfeited
property and the proceeds of its sale.'
There was little recourse available to the Lopes family at the time, al-
though developments in the law since then raise some potential defenses.6
One of the more significant developments is recognition that the Eighth
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho. B.A., Brigham Young University;
M.A., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Boalt Hall School of Law, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Thanks to Joshua Baumann and Joseph Dallas for excellent research assis-
tance. Thanks to the participants in the Inland Northwest Scholars' Workshop (2016) and
various members of the University of Idaho's Law Faculty for comments and insight. Views
expressed herein are exclusively those of the author.
' Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Government Seizures Victimize Innocent, Prrrs-





6 The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) offers some protections for
innocent owners. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2012). However, this may not have helped the
Lopeses, as they were not entirely innocent on these facts. CAFRA also offers some procedu-
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Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause could apply to, and prohibit, a civil
forfeiture so out of proportion to the gravity of the offense.7 The problem is
that it is not entirely clear how to apply the Excessive Fines Clause in a case
like that of the Lopes family; the Supreme Court has acknowledged the po-
tential applicability of the Eighth Amendment but has not given clear or
meaningful guidance for when a forfeiture should be deemed "excessive."
Forfeitures, particularly civil forfeitures, have become a powerful tool
for the Department of Justice, as well as for local law enforcement agencies.
The ability to seize assets from suspected criminals, without having to prove
their guilt, has proven irresistible, particularly because the seizing agency
usually gets to keep the seized assets for its own use. Increasing application
of forfeiture procedure in the war on drugs has caused the number and size
of asset forfeitures to skyrocket over the past thirty years.'
Abuse of forfeiture procedure stirred sufficient concern on both sides of
the aisle that in 2000, Congress, in a rare display of election-year bipartisan-
ship, passed the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (CAFRA).9 CAFRA was
designed to rein in the worst abuses of the procedure but, for a variety of
reasons, fell short of its intended objectives.0
A number of states were sufficiently concerned about the resulting in-
justices that they passed laws aimed at reining in the practice. Montana's and
New Mexico's laws purported to end civil forfeitures altogether, although
neither piece of legislation went that far." The Department of Justice, for a
time, suspended its "equitable sharing" program that allowed local law
enforcement to invoke federal forfeiture authority to seize assets and keep
a portion of the assets seized.12 But equitable sharing has now resumed,13 and
ral protections, ensuring rights to court-appointed counsel to represent individuals in the forfei-
ture proceeding before a primary residence can be taken. See 18 U.S.C. § 983(b)(2)(A) (2012).
VE.g., United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 740-42 (C.D. Cal. 1994)
(holding that forfeiture of the father's home of twenty-two years for the acts of his son was an
excessive fine barred by the Eighth Amendment).
'See DICK M. CARPENTER 11 ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE
OF CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 10 (2d ed. 2015) (noting a 4667% increase in revenue from assets
seized by civil forfeitures from 1986 to 2014).
9 Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000).
The House vote of 375-48 included "yes" votes from 191 Republicans and 183 Democrats.
H.R. 1658 (106th): Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, https://www.govtrack.us/con-
gress/votes/106-1999/h255 [https://perma.cc/H4N2-AQJQ]. The Senate then unanimously
passed the bill with changes, and the House approved the changes. H.R. 1658 (106th): Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/hrl658
[https://perma.cc/UZ92-5G8U].
10 See David Pimentel, Forfeitures Revisited: Bringing Principle to Practice in Federal
Court, 13 NEv. L.J. 1, 15 (2012).
" Both require a criminal conviction before the forfeiture can be effected, but it appears
that those proceedings are still civil in nature, particularly as they apply to forfeitures from
owners who were not actually defendants in the underlying case. See 2015 N.M. Laws 1688
(codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4 (2015)) (requiring a criminal conviction before a
forfeiture can be effected); 2015 Mont. Laws 1928 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-
207 (2015)) (same).
2 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Prohibits Federal Agency Adop-
tions of Assets Seized by State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies Except Where Needed
to Protect Public Safety (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/attorney-general-pro-
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the practice continues unabated in most states, including in some that have
attempted to limit its use.14 In the meantime, the property rights of innocent
people, as well as less-than-innocent people, are being compromised.
This article's focus is on Eighth Amendment rights, widely cited and
known to prohibit "cruel and unusual punishment" but also prohibiting "ex-
cessive bail" and "excessive fines." 5 In Austin v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court first ruled that a forfeiture could be deemed an excessive fine
under the Eighth Amendment, but only if the forfeiture was "punitive" and
not merely "remedial."'6 In United States v. Bajakajian, the Court, for the
first time, applied the Excessive Fines Clause to strike down a civil forfei-
ture. In that decision, the Court adopted and applied a standard borrowed
from the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause cases, holding that the for-
feiture is an excessive fine only if it is "grossly disproportional to the gravity
of a defendant's offense."8
This standard has not proven to be a very useful guide for lower courts,
however. It leaves them to decide whether specific amounts in particular
cases exceed the "excessive" threshold, and if so, how much the forfeiture
must be reduced to bring it within permissible constitutional bounds.19 While
the Supreme Court may have hoped that lower courts would sort out a rea-
sonable and straightforward approach to applying this "grossly dispropor-
tional" test, the result has been a patchwork of inconsistent tests that have
hibits-federal-agency-adoptions-assets-seized-state-and-local-law' [https://perma.cc/945C-,
EKLX].
" Christopher Ingraham, The Feds Have Resumed a Controversial Program That Lets
Cops Take Stuff and Keep It, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2016/03/28/the-feds-have-resumed-a-controversial-program-that-lets-cops-
take-stuff-and-keep-it/ [https://perma.cc/H5KB-VBDA].
14 See, e.g., Anne Constable, Civil Forfeiture Ongoing Despite Change to State Law,
SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/local
news/civil-forfeiture-ongoing-despite-change-to-state-law/articlebbc6c721-blff-5438-b735-
65d533fd3706.html [https://perma.cc/7SLV-S3QG]; Martin Kaste, New Mexico Ended Civil
Asset Forfeiture. Why Then Is It Still Happening?, NPR (June 7, 2016) http://www.npr.org/
2016/06/07/481058641/new-mexico-ended-civil-asset-forfeiture-why-then-is-it-still-happening
[https://perma.cc/8XTE-TBTH].
* U.S. CONsT., amend. VII.
1 See 509 U.S. 602, 609-18 (1993).
1 See 524 U.S. 321, 336-38 (1998).
8 Id. at 334.
" See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277,
295 n.92 (2014) (illustrating how the "[Bajakajian] doctrine has created a quagmire, both
with respect to the question of what a fine is and the question of what renders a fine exces-
sive"); Nicholas M. McLean, Livelihood, Ability to Pay, and the Original Meaning of the
Excessive Fines Clause, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833, 845-46 (2013) ("[E]ach circuit has
had to develop its own version of the Bajakajian[ I multi-factor gross disproportionality test,
with the gross disproportionality determination often characterized as an inherently fact-inten-
sive inquiry.") (internal quotations omitted); Yan Slavinskiy, Protecting the Family Home by
Reunderstanding United States v. Bajakajian, 35 CARDOzo L. REV. 1619, 1637-39 (2014)
(noting how circuit courts have taken different approaches in applying the factors set forth in
Bajakajian); Matthew C. Solomon, The Perils of Minimalism: United States v. Bajakajian in
the Wake of the Supreme Court's Civil Double Jeopardy Excursion, 87 GEO L.J. 849, 884
(1999) (stating that Bajakajian "provides only limited guidance to future parties and the lower
courts about the scope and applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause").
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emerged in the various circuits and only muddled the issue. The Eleventh
Circuit, for example, applies a three-factor test20 but complains about "[t]he
murkiness of these factors."2 1 The Tenth Circuit, at the other extreme, ap-
plies a nine-factor test.2 2 Yan Slavinskiy contrasts the multi-factor test ap-
proach used in these and other courts with "some courts" which "have
limited themselves to considering only one primary factor-comparison of
the value of the forfeiture with the maximum fine available under the rele-
vant statute or the sentencing guidelines calculation."23 He notes that "other
[courts] do not consider any factors at all, citing Bajakajian for the vague
proposition that courts should consider merely excessiveness."2 4 The pri-
mary point of consistency in these tests may lie in their general permissive-
ness. "In fact, in the [first] fifteen years since Bajakajian was decided, only
four courts of appeals applying Bajakajian . . . found a forfeiture to be ex-
cessive," two of which were on facts almost identical to Bajakajian's.2
Rather than look solely to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause-
which has been criticized for being a volatile area of law26-for guidance,
the courts should draw upon the Supreme Court's treatment of punitive dam-
ages under the Due Process Clause. When looking at punitive damage
awards, courts have used the rule of thumb that if the ratio of punitive dam-
ages to compensatory damages is above single digits, there is a presumption
that it violates due process, lending some consistency to lower court deci-
sions.27 A similar but more formal system for evaluating the excessiveness of
20 United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
21 United States v. Chaplin's, Inc., 646 F.3d 846, 852 (11th Cir. 2011). "These [three]
factors are not an exclusive checklist . . . . '[I]t would be futile to attempt a definitive checklist
of relevant factors. The relevant factors will necessarily vary from case to case.'" Id. at 851
n.16 (quoting United States v. 427 and 429 Hall St., Montgomery, Montgomery Cty., Ala., 74
F.3d 1165, 1172 (11th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)).
22 United States v. Wagoner Cty. Real Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th Cir. 2002)
("[I]n in addition to the Bajakajian factors, we [have] suggested other considerations: the
general use of the forfeited property, any previously imposed federal sanctions, the benefit to
the claimant, the value of seized contraband, and the property's connection with the offense.").
23 Slavinskiy, supra note 19, at 1637 (citing, inter alia, United States v. 817 N.E. 29th
Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999)) ("[I]f the value of forfeited property is within
the range of fines prescribed by Congress, a strong presumption arises that the forfeiture is
constitutional."); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 1055, 1072-73 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)
("[There is no constitutional violation when the forfeiture does not exceed the maximum fine
allowed by statute.").
24 Hill, 167 F.3d at 135 (citing United States v. Matai, Nos. 97-4129, 97-4130, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1976 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 1999) (Bajakajian analysis conducted in footnote)).
21 See id. at 1637; see also id. at 1634 n. 117 ("In a comprehensive survey of every circuit
court that has applied Bajakajian to structure their excessiveness inquiry, the author found
only four courts that have found forfeiture to be excessive. Two of these cases, United States v.
Ramirez, 421 F. App'x 950 (11th Cir. 2011) and United States v. Beras, 183 F.3d 22 (1st Cir.
1999), have facts virtually identical to Bajakajian. The other two decisions, Von Hofe v. United
States, 492 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2007) and United States v. 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d 1191
(9th Cir. 1999), superseded by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2012), involve the forfeiture of family
homes.").
26 See generally John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899 (2011) (noting that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishment Clause jurisprudence has been highly volatile and problematic over the past century).
2 7 See State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 411 (2003).
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a fine, drawing on the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual as a measure of
the gravity of the offense, could provide trial courts and law enforcement
with functional tools and meaningful standards for the constitutional analy-
sis. In addition, an approach that gives teeth to the Excessive Fines Clause in
these cases may also provide a long overdue check on the government's
overreach in forfeiture cases.28 Congress's attempt to rein in forfeiture abuse,
through CAFRA, has failed to curb these excesses;29 perhaps a revitalized,
functional, and practical Excessive Fines Clause analysis can do what
CAFRA could not.
This article begins with a description of what civil forfeitures are and
how forfeiture procedure has, in some instances, led to abuse and overreach
by law enforcement. In Part II, it explains how the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil forfeitures, including the vague and
unworkable standard adopted by the Supreme Court, and the courts' failure
to pay adequate attention to the problem of the owner's ability to pay. Part
III describes how the Supreme Court has addressed constitutional limits on
punitive damages, including the introduction of mathematical ratios as part
of the test. The article concludes with Part IV, which lays out specific for-
mulae that could be adopted to guide courts in the application of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause in these cases. By drawing on the Sentencing Guidelines, a
court can determine the seriousness of the offense, and then do a mathemati-
cal calculation to generate a ratio by which the excessiveness of a fine can
objectively assessed.
I. WHAT ARE Civw FoRFETTUREs AND WHY ARE THEY PROBLEMATIC?
At the outset, it is important to understand the difference between a
criminal forfeiture and a civil forfeiture. The former follows a criminal con-
viction of the owner of the property and functions primarily as an additional
punishment of the wrongdoer. The latter requires no criminal conviction, or
even criminal charges, against the owner or anyone else. The jurisdiction for
a civil forfeiture is in rem, so the guilt of the owner of the property is not
relevant.30 A case brought in rem is brought against the property, and it is
sufficient that the property is considered guilty.3'
These seizures fall into three different categories of forfeitable property,
each of which is grounded in different legal justifications and public policy
objectives: (1) contraband, (2) proceeds of an illicit activity, and (3) facilitat-
28 See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 23-32 (discussing the injustices inherent in, and toler-
ated by, the current forfeitures system).
29 Id.; see also Constable, supra note 14 (illustrating that state legislation has similarly
fallen short of eliminating the evils of the civil forfeiture practice).
" See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 26-28.
" See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996); Goldsmith-Grant Co. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 505, 513 (1921).
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ing property or "instrumentalities" of crime.3 2 It is important to distinguish
these types of forfeitures, and to understand the nature of each, as the Eighth
Amendment will apply only to forfeitures that are, at least in part, punitive.33
A. Types of Civil Forfeitures
1. Forfeiture of Contraband
Contraband is forfeitable for purely remedial reasons; the forfeiture of
illegal drugs, obscene material, or adulterated food is not designed to punish
the owner, but to remove the noxious material from circulation. These are
the least controversial of forfeitures. We need not be concerned with the
rights of owners, because any protection for owners' rights to such property
would "frustrate[ ] the express public policy against the possession of such
objects."3 4 The forfeiture of contraband, therefore, serves remedial purposes
and would not be characterized as punitive. As discussed infra, this is a
critical distinction, because only a punitive forfeiture would be considered a
"fine" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment." Accordingly, contraband
forfeitures will be viewed as entirely beyond the reach of the Excessive
Fines Clause.3 6
2. Forfeiture of Proceeds
Proceeds, by contrast, originally applied to stolen property. In such
cases, the forfeiture by the thief in favor of the owner "has a powerful resti-
tutionary justification."37 In recent years, a variety of federal statutes, start-
ing with the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),38
have "dramatically enlarged this category to include the earnings from vari-
ous illegal transactions," including the drug trade.39 The theory here is one
of unjust enrichment, that one should never be allowed to profit from his or
her criminal activity, and that the property seized is something that the
claimant never had a legitimate right to in the first place.40
32 See, e.g., Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing One 1958 Plym-
outh Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave.,
Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 121, n.16 (1993); Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S.
395, 399 (1877)).
3 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993).
34 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965).
3 See infra, Part I.A.
36 See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 Id.
" Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 2016)).
3 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 459 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. 92 Buena Vista
Ave., Rumson, N.J., 507 U.S. 111, 121, n.16, (1993)); see also Annemarie Bridy, Carpe
Omnia: Civil Forfeiture in the War on Drugs and the War on Piracy, 46 ARIz. ST. L.J. 683,
694-700 (2014) (discussing the history and use of civil forfeitures in the war on the drugs).
* David Pimentel, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 F.R.D. 1, 6
(1998).
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Proceeds forfeitures are unique because they allow the seizure of sub-
stitute assets.4 1 If the claimant made fifty thousand dollars dealing drugs, the
law allows the forfeiture of any fifty thousand dollars the claimant may pos-
sess-there is no requirement, or reason to insist, that it be the same fifty
thousand dollars that was earned in the drug trade.
A particularly interesting and divisive question is whether proceeds for-
feitures should be viewed as solely remedial, or whether they may be applied
in a punitive way. This issue, critical for the application of the Eighth
Amendment, is explored in Part II.B.
3. Forfeiture of Facilitating Property
Facilitating property forfeitures, sometimes referred to as instrumental-
ity forfeitures, are by far the most problematic constitutionally. These cases
involve the forfeiture of property that (unlike contraband) is licit, and that
(unlike proceeds) is legally acquired. The property becomes forfeitable only
because of how the property has been used; specifically, the forfeitable prop-
erty "includes tools or instrumentalities that a wrongdoer has used in the
commission of a crime."42 These types of forfeitures have repeatedly been
upheld against due process challenges notwithstanding the fact that the
owner may have been entirely innocent.4 3 If, for example, the criminal bor-
rows or steals a car and uses it to commit the crime, the car may be forfeited
as facilitating property, although the forfeiture harms only the car's owner.44
CAFRA created an "innocent owner" defense, in an effort to remedy this
injustice, but because the burden of proof is on the owner to prove his own
innocence, and because owners are understandably reluctant to come for-
ward and give testimony tying them to the criminal evidence, this defense
has had only a limited impact.45 But even if these forfeitures are beyond the
reach of the Due Process Clause, they may still be subjected to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.46
41 See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1153, 100 Stat.
3207-13. The substitute assets provisions apply to RICO forfeitures as well, and appear to go
beyond mere proceeds and allow forfeiture of substitute assets for instrumentalities of these
crimes. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (2012).
42 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 380
U.S. 693, 699 (1965)).
4 See discussion of Bennis and Goldsmith-Grant, infra at Part I.B.
"See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 455 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Van Oster v. Kansas, 272
U.S. 465 (1926)).
45 Pimentel, supra note 10, at 7 (noting that eighty percent of civil forfeitures are uncon-
tested); see also Constable, supra note 14 (discussing a recent case on precisely these facts).
' They are subject to the Eighth Amendment if they are at all punitive, and Austin sug-
gests that even the civil in rem forfeitures qualify for such treatment. See United States v.
Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993) ("We conclude, therefore, that forfeiture generally and statu-
tory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at least in part, as punish-
ment."). But see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 (1998) (stating in dictum that
"[t]raditional in rem forfeitures were thus not considered punishment against the individual
for an offense."). For a more detailed analysis on problems with the Bajakajian decision, see
discussion infra Part II.D. This statement in Bajakajian was immaterial to the holding, because
2017] 547
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B. History of Forfeitures
Although heavy use of forfeitures by law enforcement is a relatively
new development, the roots of the procedure are ancient.47 Early examples
are found in Mosaic Law, which prescribed that if an ox gores a man, the ox
shall be killed and its flesh not eaten.4 8 More relevant to our common law
jurisprudence are the Navigation Acts of the Seventeenth Century, which
allowed for the seizure of ships employed in piracy and smuggling, a clear
example of a facilitating property forfeiture.49 The roots of civil in rem for-
feiture are so deep that twentieth century case law relied on its hoary history
as a reason to uphold its constitutionality, even in cases where the equities
cut strongly in favor of innocent owners.0 Two examples are worth noting.
First, in Goldsmith-Grant v. United States, an automobile dealer fi-
nanced a vehicle at the sale, retaining a security interest in the car."1 The
purchaser of the car, however, used it to run liquor illegally during the Prohi-
bition.52 When the car was seized, the dealer argued that the government had
seized his property without due process, particularly since the dealer was
entirely innocent of the liquor running charge.53
Second, in Bennis v. Michigan, Mr. Bennis took the family car out and
engaged a prostitute in it.5 When Mr. Bennis was arrested, the car was
seized." Mrs. Bennis, who was certainly innocent in this case (indeed, there
is no way to imagine her complicity in the crime), contested the forfeiture of
her one-half interest in the car.56
In both cases, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claimants' argu-
ments, citing the long history of the doctrine and of the legal fiction of
"guilty property."7 The doctrine was in existence at the time the Constitu-
tion was adopted, after all, and the Supreme Court reaffirmed in 1815,11
1827,19 and 184460 upholding the forfeiture of ships. Against such a back-
drop, the Supreme Court in 1996 felt that its hands were tied and ruled
Bajakajian involved a criminal in personam forfeiture, not a civil in rem forfeiture.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 333 ("[T]he Government has sought to punish respondent by pro-
ceeding against him criminally, in personam, rather than proceeding in rem against the cur-
rency. It is therefore irrelevant whether respondent's currency is an instrumentality; the
forfeiture is punitive . . . .").
47 See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 7-8.
* Exodus 21:28 (King James).
4 An Act for the Encouraging and Increasing of Shipping and Navigation 1660, 12 Car. 2
c. 18, § I (Eng.); CHARLEs DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-139 A, CRIME AND FoRFEI-
TURE 2-3 (2007).
50 See Caleb Nelson, The Constitutionality of Civil Forfeiture, 125 YALE L.J. 2446,
2457-67 (2016) (discussing the history of in rem civil forfeitures).
51 254 U.S. 505, 508-09 (1921).
52 Id. at 508.
. Id. at 509.
5 516 U.S. 442, 444-45 (1996).
55 Id.
56 Id.
s Id. at 446-50; Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1921).
5 8The Mary, 13 U.S. 126, 151 (1815).
' The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827) (piracy).
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against Mrs. Bennis: "We conclude today, as we concluded 75 years ago [in
Goldsmith-Grant], that the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are
'too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to
be now displaced."'61
C. Abuse of the Procedure
Documented elsewhere is the "parade of horribles" that the doctrine
has produced in the past thirty years. Congress held hearings in the 1990s,
where witnesses told shocking stories of innocent property owners summa-
rily relieved of their property on nothing more than suspicion that a crime
may have occurred.62 The burden of proof was on the property owner to
prove the property's innocence (and we know from Bennis that the owner's
innocence was immaterial).63
At the same time, the Department of Justice implemented a program
called "equitable sharing," which allowed local law enforcement to seize
assets under federal authority and keep a portion of the assets forfeited."
This allowed officials to take advantage of the favorable legal standards for
forfeitures in federal court.65 The result was a bonanza for local law enforce-
' The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 210 (1844). Justice Story explained the concept in
his 1827 opinion in The Palmyra:
The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is at-
tached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense be malum prohibitum, or
malum in se. The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the
Admiralty. Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in
rem, and there is no accompanying penalty in personam. Many cases exist, where
there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty.
25 U.S. at 14.
6 Bennis, 516 U.S. at 453 (quoting Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511). Justice Thomas's
concurrence did not hide his distaste for the result, but rather concluded: "This case is a re-
minder that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit everything that is intensely undesir-
able." Id. at 454 (Thomas, J., concurring). It is worth noting that the Bennis case characterized
civil in rem forfeitures under the headings of both "punitive and remedial jurisprudence." Id.
at 442 (majority opinion).
62 See, e.g., Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 1835 Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 105, 193-200 (1997) (prepared statements from the
American Civil Liberties Union and Cato Institute).
6 See Bennis, 516 U.S at 456-61 (documenting the well-established authority rejecting
the innocent owner defense before the enactment of CAFRA). However, CAFRA in 2000
created an "innocent owner" defense, albeit one that is difficult to invoke and of limited value
to owners. Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, P.L. 106-185, 114 Stat. 202 (2000)
(enacting that now "the burden of proof is on the Government to establish, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the property is subject to forfeiture"); see also Pimentel, supra note 10, at
26-27.
' DEPT OF JUSTICE, GUIDE To EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAw EN-
FORCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/criminal-afmls/file/794696/download
[https://perma.cc/BLB6-XUQ6].
6 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976
(1984); see also The Fund, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/afp/fund [https://
perma.cc/WP83-YTDC] (describing the national asset forfeiture program of the Department of
Justice).
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ment, which could parlay any suspicious circumstance-including the carry-
ing of large quantities of cash-into an excuse to seize the desired
property.66
The city attorney in Las Cruces, New Mexico provides an example of
how law enforcement officials could abuse civil forfeitures. In 2014, he
boasted that through civil forfeitures: "We could be czars. We could own the
city. We could be in the real estate business."67 He detailed how police
targeted nice vehicles and other desirable assets, but that they should pursue
bigger fish: "This is a gold mine! A gold mine! You can seize a house, not a
vehicle!" 8
The fact that the law enforcement agencies get to keep the seized assets,
of course, creates a conflict of interest, if not a moral hazard.69 Literally
billions of dollars have been generated through these seizures.70 There are
reports of police departments creating wish lists of assets they want and
choosing raid targets accordingly.' There are concerns that police prioritize
their work to maximize forfeitures, neglecting a range of other cases, such as
domestic violence cases, that rarely generate assets for the department.72 As
noted in the Harvard Law Review, "Civil forfeiture changes police behavior
. . . : the allure of cash diverts police attention from nonfinancial crimes
toward more lucrative drug cases. Within drug cases, police prefer to raid
' See, e.g., Michael Sallah et al., Police Seizure of Motorists' Cash on Rise, Netting $2.5
Billion Since 9/11, Cm. TRus. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/auto
motive/sns-wp-washpost-bc-forfeiture-1-repeat06-20140906-story.html [https://perma.cc/H9T
4-MV9S].
67 Laura Sullivan, Police Can Seize And Sell Assets Even When The Owner Broke No Law,
NPR (Nov. 10, 2014, 5:46 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/11/10/3631024
33/police-can-seize-and-sell-assets-even-when-the-owner-broke-no-law [https://perma.cclDE
C7-BK47].
' Id. Needless to say, these statements attracted a lot of unfavorable attention; the episode
ended with the city attorney going on leave as "a personnel matter" and then being replaced as
city attorney a month later. See James Staley, Las Cruces City Attorney on Leave After Contro-
versial Comments Emerge, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 20, 2014) https://www.abqjournal.com/
499037/las-cruces-city-attorney-on-leave-after-controversial-comments-emerge.html [perma
.cc/2SJA-VQY8]; Press Release, City of Las Cruces, New City Attorney Named (Dec. 2014),
http://www.las-cruces.org/en/departments/public-information-office/news-releases/2014/de-
cember/new-city-attorney-named [perma.cclY82E-ALXY].
6 United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive, 845 F. Supp. 725, 735 (C.D. Cal. 1994) ("Failure
to strictly enforce the Excessive Fines Clause inevitably gives the government an incentive to
investigate criminal activity in situations involving valuable property, regardless of its serious-
ness, but to ignore more serious criminal activity that does not provide financial gain for the
government.").
70 Developments in the Law, Chapter One, Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1723,
1732 (2015).
71 Shaila Dewan, Police Use Department Wish List When Deciding Which Assets to Seize,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/l 1/10/us/police-use-department-
wish-list-when-deciding-which-assets-to-seize.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3L3U-RFL8].
72 Richard Miniter, Ill-Gotten Gains, REASON.COM (Aug. 1, 1993), http://reason.com/
archives/1993/08/01 /ill-gotten-gains/ [https://perma.cc/QF5L-KFBU]; see also Karis Ann-Yu
Chi, Comment, Follow the Money: Getting to the Root of the Problem with Civil Asset Forfei-
ture in California, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1635, 1637, 1665 (2002); Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen,
Policing for Profit: The Drug War's Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. Cm. L. REV. 35, 62
(1998).
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drug buyers instead of sellers because the former are more likely to
have cash."73
There are reports of police officers conducting traffic stops and asking
every driver they stop how much cash they are carrying, only to seize the
cash if it is a substantial sum.74 New concerns have been raised in recent
months, as some law enforcement officers are now equipped with card-read-
ing technology that allows them to seize prepaid debit cards and confiscate
whatever money is loaded on the card."5 Victims of the seizures who profess
their innocence are sometimes told that they can contest the seizure of their
cash, or other assets, but with cautionary words: "Good luck proving it.
You'll burn it up in attorney fees before we give it back to you."76
The problem is not limited to the seizure of assets from innocent per-
sons. Even when there is wrongdoing, there may be no correlation between
the seriousness of the owner's wrongdoing and the total value forfeited. Po-
lice intent on seizing valuable assets have strong incentives to target the
owners, looking for an excuse to claim the desired property and deeming
virtually any suspicious activity "good enough."7
The case of the Lopes family, which introduced this article, illustrates
the harshness of federal civil forfeiture as a tool in the War on Drugs. An-
other case aired in congressional hearings on the forfeiture crisis in the mid-
1990s involved Bill Munnerlyn," who operated his own small business: an
airplane charter service. His airplane was seized by federal authorities after
he transported a client who was suspected of carrying drug money.79 Mr.
Munnerlyn spent $85,000 on legal fees and was forced to sell his three other
planes to finance the legal battle to recover his seized plane.s0 When he fi-
nally got the plane back, Mr. Munnerlyn found that the government had
" Policing and Profit, supra note 70, at 1735 (citing Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner,
For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REV. 853, 869 (2014)).
74 Ingraham, supra note 13. Presumably the fact that the individual is carrying a large sum
of cash is, standing alone, sufficient basis to suspect criminal activity, and therefore forms the
basis for the seizure. Clifton Adcock & Ben Fenwick, Asset Forfeiture: Do Police Seize Inno-
cent People's Money?, OKLA. WATCH (Aug. 31, 2015), http://oklahomawatch.org/2015/08/31/
asset-forfeiture-do-police-seize-innocent-peoples-money/ [https:/perma.cc/PC97-TRM2]
("[S]heriff Randall Edwards, an outspoken supporter of seizure laws, has aid that amounts of
$10,000 or more are among the key indicators that cash is likely connected to drug
operations.").
" Cristina Corbin, Oklahoma's Use of Card Readers to Freeze, Seize Funds Comes Under
Fire, Fox NEWS (June 17, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/techl2016/06/17/oklahomas-use-
card-readers-to-freeze-seize-funds-comes-under-fire.html [https://perma.cc/NZE9-S8LJ].
76 Ingraham, supra note 13 (embedded video at 0:54). Michael Van Den Berg has pro-
posed to remedy these types of situations by raising the transactional cost for police to conduct
civil forfeitures so it is no longer profitable for the police to pursue forfeitures under ten
thousand dollars. Michael Van Den Berg, Comment, Proposing a Transaction Approach to
Civil Forfeiture Reform, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 867 (2015).
n See, e.g., Sallah et al., supra note 64 ("For many innocents caught in the seizure net, the
biggest misstep was carrying more cash than police thought was normal for law-abiding
citizens.").
7 Helen M. Kemp, Presumed Guilty: When the War on Drugs Becomes a War on the
Constitution, 14 QUINNIPIAc L. REV. 273, 274 (1994).
79 H.R. REP. No. 106-192, at 8 (1999).
8 Id.
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done extensive damage to it ($100,000 worth), presumably searching for
drugs or other evidence." Sovereign immunity protected the government
from liability for the damage done, so Mr. Munnerlyn lost his business and
was forced to declare personal bankruptcy.82
A third horror story told to the House Judiciary Committee, and in-
cluded in its report, illustrates the potential for profiling and unfair enforce-
ment. In 1991, Willie Jones attempted to fly to Houston to purchase nursery
stock for his landscaping business in Tennessee, carrying with him nine
thousand dollars in cash.83 He explained that it is easier to strike deals, espe-
cially for someone from out of town, if he paid in cash: "[T]he nursery
business is kind of like the cattle business. You can always do better with
cash money."m At the airport, he was confronted by officers who accused
him of dealing drugs." Their background check on him showed him to be
"clean," so they had to let him go, but because drug-sniffing dogs alerted
them to the money, they kept the currency.6 The officers did not actually
count the money and refused to issue a receipt for it." Mr. Jones, who is
African American, sued for the return of his money, arguing, among other
things, that he was the victim of racial profiling by police.8 He ultimately
succeeded in securing the return of his nine thousand dollars, but only after
more than two years of litigation and a weeklong trial, in which the court
held that the government had failed to meet even the modest burden of
showing probable cause for the seizure.8 9 But the problem persists, as long as
8 Id.
82 Id. at 9. Apparently, Mr. Munnerlyn ended up driving a truck for a living after the
government's failed attempt to forfeit his plane destroyed his business and his credit. Id.
83 Id. at 6.
8 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 6-7.
87 Id. at 7.
88 Id.
89 Jones v. U.S. Drug Enf't Admin., 819 F. Supp. 698, 724 (M.D. Tenn. 1993). The court
declined to enter an injunction, however, and held that Jones did not prove that he was the
victim of racial discrimination. The court's observation about forfeitures in general is
compelling:
The Court also observes that the statutory scheme as well as its administrative imple-
mentation provide substantial opportunity for abuse and potentiality for corruption.
DIU personnel encourage airline mployees as well as hotel and motel employees to
report "suspicious" travellers and reward them with a percentage of the forfeited
proceeds. The forfeited monies are divided and distributed by the Department of
Justice among the Metropolitan Nashville Airport and the Metropolitan Nashville
Police Department partners in the DRU and itself. As to the local agencies, these
monies are "off-budget" in that there is no requirement to account to legislative
bodies for its receipt or expenditure. Thus, the law enforcement agency has a direct
financial interest in the enforcement of these laws. The previous history in this coun-
try of an analogous kind of financial interest on the part of law enforcement of-
ficers-i.e., salaries of constables, sheriffs, magistrates, etc., based on fees or
fines-is an unsavory and embarrassing scar on the administration of justice. The
obviously dangerous potentiality for abuse extant in the forfeiture scheme should
trigger, at the very least, heightened scrutiny by the courts when a seizure is
contested.
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the law permits police to seize cash or other assets from people, such as Mr.
Jones, on such flimsy grounds," and as long as it is so costly and time-
consuming to contest such seizures.
D. Legislative Reponses to the Problem
Congress passed CAFRA in 2000, in an effort to rein in the worst
abuses. Unfortunately, the legislation-by the time it was watered down suf-
ficiently to secure passage during an election year, and by a unanimous vote
in the Senate-did far too little to contain the problem, and the crisis
continues.91
CAFRA attempted to shift the burden of proof to the government to
demonstrate that the property was indeed forfeitable, creating also an "inno-
cent owner" defense to the seizure.92 These innovations have had very little
impact, however.93 The government is forced to marshal its evidence and
persuade a court that the forfeiture is justified only if the forfeiture is con-
tested.94 Because forfeitures are contested only about twenty percent of the
time, in part due to poor notice,95 the overwhelming majority of cases can be
handled administratively without any oversight by a court." So, police are
not deterred and can retain large portions of seized property without having
their grounds for or evidence supporting the seizure examined or questioned
Id.
' The facts suggest that the dog's "alert" on the money is of extremely limited probative
value. United States v. $242,484, 351 F.3d 499, 510-11 (11th Cir. 2003) (a drug dog's sniff of
cash is "of little value" in determining whether the currency is presently being used for narcot-
ics trafficking because as much as eighty percent of all cash in circulation contains drug resi-
due). The cases go both ways on this point, however. See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 26
n.164-165.
9 Pimentel, supra note 10, at 23-32.
92 Id. at 16, 25.
9 See generally Pimentel, supra note 10. "David B. Smith, author of the [treatise] Prose-
cution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases, says the courts have been steadily mitigating the 2000
bill's impact, both by narrowly interpreting the protections it grants defendants and by being
overly deferential to prosecutors when determining if they've met the new evidentiary stan-
dard." Radley Balko, Forfeiture Folly: Cover Your Assets, REASON.COM (Apr. 2008), http://
reason.conarchives/2008/03/07/forfeiture-folly [https://perma.cclD2CF-H8KN].
9 Pimentel, supra note 10, at 7. A possible reason for the high percentage of uncontested
civil forfeitures may be the inadequate notice given to property owners. See Rebecca Hausner,
Note, Adequacy of Notice under CAFRA: Resolving Constitutional Due Process Challenges to
Administrative Forfeitures, 36 CARDOzo L. REV. 1915, 1932 (2015) (noting that "a more con-
vincing explanation for the rate of over eighty percent of uncontested administrative forfeitures
is that many claimants are simply not aware of the procedure to contest, or lack notice of the
forfeiture proceeding itself").
" Pimentel, supra note 10, at 29-31 (discussing reasons owners may be reluctant to come
forward and contest a forfeiture, including the high cost of litigation). Indeed, Mr. Jones's
willingness pursue a federal case for two years, and then take it trial, over a mere $9,000
seizure would appear to be unusual, even irrational. That makes his case a rare exception.
More likely, his case went to trial because of the civil rights claim, which he ultimately lost,
but which might have allowed him to claim his attorney fees. Jones v. U.S. Drug Enft Admin.,
819 F. Supp. 698, 723 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
96 Pimentel, supra note 10, at 7-8.
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and without having to answer any defenses, including the "innocent owner"
defense.97
Similarly, CAFRA offers little protection to innocent owners, as they
bear the burden of proving their own innocence, even as they claim the prop-
erty that law enforcement suspects is tied to criminal activity.98 By asserting
their claim to the contested property, and giving testimony regarding it, they
may well be waiving their own Fifth Amendment rights-including the right
to remain silent-as to the underlying crime.9 It is little wonder so few are
willing to come forward and claim the seized property.'"0
However, forfeiture reform does not need to come from the federal
government; state legislatures could also step in to curtail the practice. The
state of New Mexico, responding in large part to the outrage generated by
the Las Cruces City Attorney's remarks being made public, passed legisla-
tion to do away with civil forfeiture altogether.10 1 Montana has done the
same.10 But, as noted above, recent news stories suggest that notwithstand-
ing the new legislation in New Mexico, civil forfeitures are still taking place
there. 103
II. WHEN AND How DOES THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
APPLY TO FORFEniREs?
The Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment
as well as "excessive fines,"'" is designed to be a check on the power of
government to impose overly punitive sanctions on its populace. It has the
potential, therefore, to serve as a vital check on prosecutorial overreaching in
the seizure of assets. Unfortunately, the courts' application of the doctrine,
" See id. at 31-32.
9 See id. at 29-30.
9 Id. at 29.
I" See id. Nevertheless, under CAFRA, if a property owner does challenge a civil forfei-
ture and prevails against the government, he is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 28
U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A) (2012). Recently, in interpreting this provision of CAFRA, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that an attorney fees award of $50,775 of an attorney billing at
an hourly rate of $500 was reasonable. See United States v. $28,000.00 in U.S. Currency, 802
F.3d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 2015). This is powerful precedent and, if followed in other circuits,
it may deter police from pursuing assets in dubious or marginal circumstances.
101 2015 N.M. Laws 1688 (codified in N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-27-4 (West 2017) (requiring
a criminal conviction for a civil forfeiture); see also Nick Sibilla, Civil Forfeiture Now Re-




102 2015 Mont. Laws 1928 (codified in MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-12-207 (2015) (requiring
a criminal conviction for a civil forfeiture).
103 See Kaste, supra note 14; Nicky Woolf, Woman sues Albuquerque for Seizing Car
Despite Ban on Civil Asset Forfeiture, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.theguar-
dian.com/us-news/2016/aug/31/woman-sues-albuquerque-seizing-civil-asset-forfeiture-ban
[https://perma.cc/9LZ8-9QF].
" U.S. CONST., amend. VIII.
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discussed below, has been too unfocused to establish effective limits on for-
feitures, or to give meaningful guidance on what those limitations may be.
A. When Forfeitures Are Subject to Excessive Fines Analysis
The seminal case is Austin, which lays out the essentials of the analysis,
helping us understand when and how the Eighth Amendment might apply to
a civil forfeiture. The Excessive Fines Clause "limits the government's
power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as punishment for
some offense."' 0 The government had argued that a civil in rem forfeiture
could not be a "fine," given its civil nature,'o6 but the Court recognized that
even civil forfeitures could be punitive. The Court held that a forfeiture, civil
or criminal, may be characterized as a fine for Eighth Amendment purposes
if it serves, even in part, to punish the property owner for an offense that has
been committed.07 Thus, in applying the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment to forfeitures, the first issue that must be addressed is
whether the forfeiture is strictly remedial'0 or whether it is at all punitive:'"
that is, whether it serves either retributive or deterrence purposes."i0 If a
forfeiture is entirely remedial-for example, compensating the government
for lost revenues-it cannot be characterized as a fine, and the Eighth
Amendment does not apply."' But, as already noted, "forfeiture generally
and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been under-
stood, at least in part, as punishment," and are therefore subject to the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause.112
'e Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989)).
'" See id. at 607. The Court had previously held that a punitive damages award was not a
fine, despite its explicitly punitive purpose, because punitive damages are not paid to the state.
See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260. A civil forfeiture is paid to the state; the harder question
for forfeitures is whether, and to what degree, they are intended as punishment.
10 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610. Forfeitures in kind "are thus 'fines' if they constitute
punishment for an offense." United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328 (1998).
1" See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610; Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329 (citing One Lot Emerald Cut
Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam)).
" See Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 ("Thus, the question is not, as the United States would
have it, whether forfeiture . . . is civil or criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.").
' See id. (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989)) ("[A] civil sanc-
tion that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be ex-
plained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come
to understand the term."); Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 329 ("Deterrence, however, has tradition-
ally been viewed as a goal of punishment.").
.. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 n.14 ("The Clause prohibits only the imposition of 'exces-
sive' fines, and a fine that serves purely remedial purposes cannot be considered 'excessive' in
any event."); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 103 (1997). -
"l2Austin, 509 U.S. at 618; see also id. at 610-11 ("We, however, must determine that i
can only be explained as serving in part to punish."). But see Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331
("Traditional in rem forfeitures were thus not considered punishment against the individual for
an offense."). This dictum in the Bajakajian decision is a curious one, because it appears to be
in direct conflict with the holding in Austin, as observed by the dissenters in Bajakajian. See
id. at 347 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The majority suggests in rem forfeitures of the instru-
mentalities of crimes are not fines at all.").
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A problem arises in the context of the innocent owner, however, be-
cause the Court in Bennis held that there was no innocent owner defense
inherent in the Eighth Amendment."' As a result, it could not protect Mrs.
Bennis, whose husband had used the car to engage a prostitute, from the
seizure of the family car. But post-Bajakajian, it may be possible still for
someone in Mrs. Bennis's situation to claim protection of the Eighth Amend-
ment, based not on her special status as an innocent, but rather on the dispro-
portionality of the punishment she's suffering. Mrs. Bennis did not raise the
issue in terms of disproportionality, as the test did not exist at the time. The
forfeiture of her property will certainly have a deterrent effect as Bennis
recognized1 l4 and is therefore punitive, as Bajakajian recognized. Accord-
ingly, the seizure of her interest in the family car may still be grossly dispro-
portional under the Eighth Amendment."' Excluding the innocent altogether
from Eighth Amendment protection would yield nonsensical results, since a
forfeiture from a modestly culpable person could be unconstitutionally ex-
cessive, but the same forfeiture from an innocent person would not be.1 6
Indeed, since the issue is the proportionality of the forfeiture/fine to the
gravity of the offense-as determined, post-Bennis, in Bajakaian-and an
innocent owner has committed no offense at all, one might argue that any
forfeiture beyond a de minimis one would be per se disproportional, and
likely grossly disproportional."'
B. Proceeds Forfeitures and the Excessive Fines Clause
Contraband forfeitures, as noted above, are inherently remedial.
Whatever the state has prohibited can and must be confiscated to serve the
remedial purpose of the statute banning it. So the Eighth Amendment pre-
sumably will not apply to contraband forfeiture. A facilitating property for-
feiture-the classic in rem civil forfeiture-is typically seen as punitive, at
'" See 516 U.S. 442, 443 (1996).
" See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996) (alteration in original) (quoting
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 687 (1974)) ("Forfeiture of prop-
erty prevents illegal uses 'both by preventing further illicit use of the [property] and by impos-
ing an economic penalty, thereby rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."'). Although Bennis
stated that "forfeiture also serves a deterrent purpose distinct from any punitive purpose," id.,
Bajakajian, decided later, stated that "[d]eterrence, however, has traditionally been viewed as
a goal of punishment," 524 U.S. at 329.
" 5 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
116 E.g., the Excessive Fines Clause would protect Mr. Bennis from over-punishment for
his relatively minor indecency offense, but would not protect Mrs. Bennis from the same pun-
ishment for her blameless behavior, precisely because her behavior was blameless.
11' See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324. The Court, however, has shown great reluctance, in
both Goldsmith-Grant and Bennis, to take steps to constitutionally protect innocent owners in
in rem forfeiture cases. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 454-55 (Thomas, J., concurring). The Court
was also hostile to takings claims by innocent owners for just compensation of the property
forfeited. See id. at 452 ("The government may not be required to compensate an owner for
property which it has already lawfully acquired under the exercise of governmental authority
other than the power of eminent domain.").
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least in part, according to Austin."' Accordingly, we should expect the
Eighth Amendment to apply to those.
Proceeds forfeitures, however, present a more difficult case. They are
widely viewed as remedial; after all, it is not punishment to deprive someone
of something they never had a right to in the first place. Following this line
of thinking, the seizure of assets acquired through illegal activity would not
violate the Excessive Fines Clause. Indeed, most circuits have held that a
proceeds forfeiture dodges Eighth Amendment scrutiny either because it is
non-punitive or because it could never be considered grossly disproportional
to the crime itself." 9
But the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Jalaram that, in some
cases, proceeds forfeitures may be punitive.12 0 It is easy to imagine, for ex-
ample, a small player in a large conspiracy, such as a "mule" in a large drug
distribution ring, who is ordered to "forfeit" the entire profits of the drug
conspiracy, even though this individual never saw more than the modest
payment she received for carrying drugs across the border.'2 '
Indeed, in its 2010 Jalaram decision, the Fourth Circuit expressly de-
clined to follow the other circuits' conclusion that proceeds forfeitures are
inherently remedial, opting instead for a more nuanced view, based on de-
tailed analysis of the Supreme Court's holdings in Austin v. United States,'m
"' See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993).
"9 See, e.g., United States v. Sum of $185,336.07 U.S. Currency Seized from Citizen's
Bank Account L7N01967, 731 F.3d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 2013) ("All of our sister courts of
appeal that have considered this provision have concluded that the forfeiture of 'guilty prop-
erty,' such as illicit drug proceeds, 'has been traditionally regarded as non-punitive' as to which
the Eighth Amendment's restrictions on punishment do not apply .... We agree with this view
and hold that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to forfeitures under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(6).") (external citations omitted); United States v. Betancourt, 422 F.3d 240, 250 (5th
Cir. 2005) ("This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment has no application to forfeiture of
property acquired with drug proceeds."); United States v. 22 Santa Barbara Drive, 264 F.3d
860, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[C]riminal proceeds represent the paradigmatic example of 'guilty
property,' the forfeiture of which has been traditionally regarded as non-punitive . . . .");
United States v. Lot 41, Berryhill Farm Estates, 128 F.3d 1386, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1997)
("Because the amount of proceeds produced by an individual drug trafficker is always roughly
equivalent to the costs that drug trafficker has imposed on society, the forfeiture of those
proceeds can never be constitutionally excessive."); Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879, 883
(7th Cir. 1996) ("Where is also no reason to conclude that the forfeiture of property or
money exchanged for contraband-that is, the proceeds of drug trafficking-is anything but re-
medial."); United States v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Forfeiture of
proceeds cannot be considered punishment, and thus, subject to the Excessive Fines Clause, as
it simply parts the owner from the fruits of the criminal activity."); see also United States v.
$184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1995) ("We therefore hold that
the forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) of proceeds from illegal drug transactions, or pro-
ceeds traceable to such transactions, does not constitute 'punishment' within the meaning of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
120 See 599 F.3d 347, 355 (4th Cir. 2010) ("In a case where a defendant played a truly
minor role in a conspiracy that generated vast proceeds, joint and several liability for those
proceeds might result in a forfeiture order grossly disproportional to the individual defendant's
offence.").
121 See id.
122 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
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Alexander v. United States,123 and Bajakajian v. United States.'24 Specifi-
cally, the Fourth Circuit noted that although in the vast majority of proceeds
cases there will be no gross disproportionality to the gravity of a defendant's
offense, this does not warrant a per se rule against application of the Eighth
Amendment to proceeds forfeitures, despite the appeal of such a bright-line
test. 125
[T]he Government's proposed shortcut may work a grave injustice
in cases involving joint and several liability. In such cases, some
defendants inevitably disgorge more money than they received
from the conspiracy, thus forfeiting property that they obtained
lawfully in order to satisfy the forfeiture judgment. In a case where
a defendant played a truly minor role in a conspiracy that gener-
ated vast proceeds, joint and several liability for those proceeds
might result in a forfeiture order grossly disproportional to the in-
dividual defendant's offense. Yet, if we adopt the rule advanced by
the Government, those defendants would be unable to obtain
relief.12 6
If the reason for holding that proceeds are not subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause is because they are thought to be entirely remedial, this will
also depend on how "proceeds" are defined. If only the net proceeds of the
illicit activity are forfeited, the forfeiture may fairly be characterized as
purely remedial and not subject to the Excessive Fines Clause because it is
taking the profit, and only the profit, out of the prohibited activity. The profi-
teer, of course, has no right to such ill-gotten gains, as the activity that gen-
erated them was prohibited by law. If, however, forfeitable proceeds are
defined to include more than net profits, or if "proceeds" is defined to in-
clude gross revenues or an in-kind forfeiture the value of which is not purely
profit, the forfeiture takes on a punitive character.
The problem is not merely hypothetical. The government ypically does
argue for the forfeiture of gross revenues, disregarding costs, which goes
beyond merely disgorging the unjust enrichment.'27 To the extent that the
123 509 U.S. 544 (1993).
124 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
125 Jalaram, 599 F.3d at 354-55 ("In doing so, we recognize that in most cases, courts
ultimately will find a forfeiture of proceeds not grossly disproportional to the offense. In a case
involving a single offender, it would be very difficult, and perhaps impossible, for the defen-
dant to show that the forfeiture of proceeds was grossly disproportional to the gravity of his
offense. Thus, we can understand the desire of some of our sister circuits to simplify the
analysis by holding such forfeitures exempt from constitutional scrutiny in the first instance.").
126 Id. at 355. If the reason for holding that forfeiture of proceeds is not subject to the
Excessive Fines Clause is because they can never be grossly disproportional, this does not
necessarily end the analysis, especially in a jurisdiction such as the First Circuit which then
conducts a livelihood analysis. See discussion infra at notes 171-78.
'27 See DAVID B. SMITH, PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF FORFEITURE CASES § 10.05[6]
§ 4.03 n.185 (2012) ("The government generally urges the courts to interpret 'proceeds' to
mean gross receipts. At the same time, and without acknowledging any contradiction, the
government contends that proceeds forfeiture is inherently a remedial measure that merely
deprives criminals of their ill-gotten gains. The government cannot have it both ways.").
558 [Vol. 11
Forfeitures as Excessive Fines
forfeiture exceeds the wrongdoer's enrichment, the difference would need to
be paid out of her legitimate assets.12
The practical effect of taking more than the profit out of the illegal
activity, of course, serves deterrence and retributive purposes, i.e., non-re-
medial purposes. The punitive impact of that forfeiture, even though it is
termed a "proceeds forfeiture," should bring it within the reach of the Ex-
cessive Fines Clause.
C. How Excessive Fines Analysis Applies
Once it is determined that the forfeiture is at least in part punitive, and
therefore a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment, the question
turns to whether the fine is excessive.
In Bajakajian,129 the Supreme Court applied the principles articulated in
Austin to strike down a forfeiture under the Eighth Amendment. The case
involved a man who attempted to take a large sum of cash out of the United
States without properly declaring it on the required customs forms.'" It was
not a terribly egregious infraction; no one suggested, then or now, that the
cash was improperly held or connected in any way with illegal activity.'3 1
Mr. Bajakajian's sole violation was the failure to disclose that he had it with
him. And, the court noted, his failure was apparently prompted by cultural
differences, as he had grown up as part of an Armenian minority in Syria,
where he had learned to be distrustful of government officials.'32
Following Austin, the Court found the forfeiture to be punitive, and held
that "a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly
disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense."'33 A forfeiture of the
full amount of undeclared cash-more than $350,000 in this case-for such
a minor offense, the Court held, constitutes an excessive fine in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.13 4 The Court did uphold the forfeiture of $15,000 of
the money, an arguably arbitrary amount assessed by the district court, but
only because the parties had not appealed that assessment.3 5
128 Also, as the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Jalaram, there is a problem where the pro-
ceeds being forfeited are jointly owned, but the owners are not equally culpable. See 599 F.3d
at 355. As interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, the gross disproportionality analysis refers specifi-
cally to gravity of the offense, not the culpability of the owner. See id. If the offense was
serious enough, the forfeiture might not be disproportional to its gravity, but the fine may
nonetheless excessive as to the less culpable defendant. See id.
129 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
1
3 0 See id. at 324.
1' See id. at 337-38.
32 See id. at 326 ("The District Court further found that respondent had failed to report
that he was taking the currency out of the United States because of fear stemming from 'cul-
tural differences': Respondent, who had grown up as a member of the Armenian minority in
Syria, had a 'distrust for the Government."').
133 Id. at 334.
' See id. at 337.
'" See id. at 337 n.11 ("[R]espondent did not cross-appeal the $15,000 forfeiture ordered
by the District Court. The Court of Appeals thus declined to address the $15,000 forfeiture,
2017] 559
Harvard Law & Policy Review
The "grossly disproportional" language the Court used to justify its
decision was borrowed from the Excessive Fines Clause's jurisprudential
neighbor, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.13 6 Specifically, if a
court determines that the forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity
of the offense, then that forfeiture is an excessive fine and is
unconstitutional.137
D. Problems with the Bajakajian Decision
Shortly after the Bajakajian case came down, it was criticized as a min-
imalist decision that raised more questions than it answered about the scope
and application of the Excessive Fines Clause."' Indeed, the Court made
broad pronouncements about emerging constitutional protections, yet issued
a narrow holding and rationale predicted to limit the decision's precedential
value to a narrow subset of cases.'39
In particular, the decision raised a problematic conflict with Austin,
since Bajakajian suggest that in rem civil forfeitures are typically not subject
to Excessive Fines analysis:'" "Traditional in rem forfeitures were thus not
considered punishment against the individual for an offense. Because they
were viewed as non-punitive, such forfeitures traditionally were considered
to occupy a place outside the domain of the Excessive Fines Clause."4' This
dictum flies in the face of the explicit holding of Austin, that civil in rem
forfeiture can and usually do contain some element of punishment, and
therefore are subject to the Excessive Fines Clause.142 The dissenters in
Bajakajian complained about this inconsistency, as did the Eighth Circuit in
United States v. Lippert, the latter Court remaining uncertain whether Exces-
sive Fines analysis applied to the civil in rem forfeiture in the case before
it.143 But because the issue was not part of the specific holding in
Bajakajian,'" the Austin holding should still be good law.
Assuming that Bajakajian's standard applies to civil in rem forfeitures,
consistent with the holding of Austin, the most serious problem with the
and that question is not properly presented here either."); see also id. at 348 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) ("By affirming, the majority in effect approves a . . . $15,000 forfeiture.").
136 See id. at 336 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)).
17 Id. at 337. A finding of unconstitutionality typically results in remanding the case back
to the lower court to impose limits on the forfeiture so it is not excessive. See, e.g., Von Hofe
v. United States, 492 F.3d 175, 191 (2d Cir. 2007).
138 See Solomon, supra note 19.
139 See id.
1" See Bajakajian 524 U.S. at 340-41 (stating in rem forfeiture "were not considered at
the Founding to be punishment for an offence"); see also id. at 347 (Kennedy J., dissenting)
('The majority suggest in rem forfeitures of instrumentalities of cites are not fines at all.").
141 Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
14 See 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993).
143 148 F.3d 974, 978 (8th Cir. 1998) (involving Anti-Kickback Act civil penalties).
'" 524 U.S. at 333 ("[T]he Government has sought to punish respondent by proceeding
against him criminally, in personam, rather than proceeding in rem against the currency. It is
therefore irrelevant whether espondent's currency is an instrumentality; the forfeiture is puni-
tive . . . .").
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decision remains: the "grossly disproportional" standard it adopted. That
standard does not provide a coherent framework to guide future parties and
lower courts in the application of the Excessive Fines Clause to forfeit-
ures.14 5 The words "grossly disproportional" offer almost nothing to clarify
the term "excessive." As Solomon observed shortly after the decision was
rendered:
[T]he Court's "grossly disproportional" standard is vague and
does not purport to be a uniform excessive fines test. The
Bajakajian Court declined to set guidelines on what dollar
amounts are acceptable under what circumstances, choosing in-
stead to defer to the sensibilities of the lower courts . . . . [T]he
Court could have suggested a rough baseline . . . to assure some
semblance of uniformity and fairness in future cases . . . . Further-
more, by approaching the unique facts of Bajakajian in isolation,
the Court applied its newly-borrowed standard in a fashion that
makes it unclear what future criminal fines may be deemed consti-
tutionally excessive.''4
Not only is "gross disproportionality" in the eye of the beholder, the
"gravity of the offense" is difficult to discern by any objective standard. In a
footnote, Justice Thomas observed, "In considering an offense's gravity, the
other penalties that the Legislature has authorized are certainly relevant evi-
dence," 47 reflecting the understanding that the legislature decides what is a
crime and what is not, often prescribing the contours for punishment, and in
so doing determines how serious the crime may be.148 But Justice Thomas
did not find the legislatively prescribed maximum penalties to be helpful in
this particular case.149
Of course, even though congressionally authorized penalties are "rele-
vant evidence,"'" there is also some tension inherent in allowing the legisla-
ture to define constitutional standards. If the Court defers to Congress for the
decision of what is proportional (and therefore what is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment), the Court may be failing to perform its con-
stitutional duty, offending separation of powers principles in its failure to
check congressional power.'5'
145 Solomon, supra note 19, at 875-76.
'4 Id. at 877-78 (citations omitted).
1
4 7 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336, 338 n.14.
148 Excellent examples are anti-narcotics laws governing the possession and use of mari-
juana, which carries serious penalties under federal law, and in many states, but which has
been entirely decriminalized in other states, which presumably perceive the offense as to be so
innocuous as to be unworthy of any criminal penalties.
149 See quote and discussion infra, at note 208 et seq.
1
5o Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336, 338 n.14.
... See id (suggesting that non-judicial guidelines for punishment "cannot override the
constitutional requirement of proportionality review").
2017]1 561
Harvard Law & Policy Review
E. Ability to Pay and the Deprivation of One's Livelihood
Another problem with the Bajakajian decision is its failure to consider
the individual's ability to pay. There is considerable evidence that the Exces-
sive Fines Clause was intended to protect the individual from the imposition
of fines that would be ruinous to him in particular. If that is what "exces-
sive" means, then it is not enough to evaluate the proportionality of the fine
to the seriousness of the offense. A fine that is easily paid by one party
might be genuinely devastating to a less affluent individual who had com-
mitted the same offense. Characteristics of the offender must be relevant as
well.
The historical roots of the Excessive Fines Clause are explained in con-
siderable detail by Nicholas McLean, who traces the principles back to the
English Bill of Rights in 1689 and even earlier.15 2 In particular, he calls
attention to the:
largely forgotten principle of English law known as salvo contene-
mento suo (translated as "saving his contenement," or livelihood).
Enshrined in the Magna Carta, this principle had become firmly
established as a fundamental principle at common law by the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries. The principle required, among
other things, that a defendant not be fined an amount that exceeded
his ability to pay. The historical evidence suggests that the English
Bill of Rights' outlawing of "excessive fines" was intended-at
least in part-to reaffirm this principle."'
McLean goes on to argue that the financial capacity of the offender is an
essential factor in any excessive fines analysis. "As a historical matter," he
contends, "the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment can appro-
priately be understood as encoding two complementary, but distinct, consti-
tutional principles: (1) a proportionality principle, linking the penalty to the
offense, and (2) an additional limiting principle linking the penalty imposed
to the offender's economic status and circumstances."'
In particular, the livelihood of the individual, his capacity to support
himself, is a matter of particular sensitivity, demanding special protection.
The Magna Carta was explicit in this regard, protecting an individual's right
to retain his means of livelihood:
A Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the
manner of the fault; and for a great fault after the greatness
thereof, saving to him his contenement; (2) and a Merchant like-
wise, saving to him his merchandise; (3) and any other's villain
than ours shall be likewise amerced, saving his wainage.'5 5
152 See McLean, supra note 19, at 835-38.
153 Id. at 385-86.
154 Id. at 386.
115 Magna Carta, 9 Hen. III, ch. 14 (1225), 1 Stat. at Large 6-7 (1762 ed.).
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The equitable principles behind such rules are evident in the modem
jurisprudence of bankruptcy. The discharge of otherwise ruinous debt is con-
sidered to be a worthy legal objective, notwithstanding the injustice it inevi-
tably wreaks on blameless creditors.1 6 The homestead exemption in
bankruptcy (and in taxation) is designed to ensure that the debtor (or tax-
payer) is not rendered homeless by the financial obligation.1 5 1
The concept is closely related to "forfeiture of estate," a severe punish-
ment that was meted out against traitors and other felons, by which their
entire estate was seized by the Crown.159 In English society, where inherited
landholdings were a person's claim to both livelihood and social status, this
was a particularly harsh punishment, ensuring the impoverishment not only
of the wrongdoer, but of his progeny for generations to come.159 Accord-
ingly, the drafters of the U.S. Constitution were careful to explicitly prohibit
forfeiture of estate as a punishment for treason.160 Within months of conven-
ing, the very first Congress passed separate legislation barring forfeiture of
estate for any other crime as well.161
This provides context for understanding the Excessive Fines Clause it-
self, adopted shortly after the Constitution, with the ratification of the Bill of
Rights. The language of the Eighth Amendment states simply: "Excessive
156 See e.g., Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OIo
ST. L.J. 1047, 1047, 1059 (1987); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367
(2007) ("Mhe principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide debtors in bankruptcy
with a fresh start.").
117 See Alison D. Morantz, There's No Place Like Home: Homestead Exemption and Judi-
cial Constructions of Family in Nineteenth-Century America, 24 LAW & HiST. REv. 245,
250-51 (2006).
1
8 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-139 A, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 2
(2007).
'19 THOMAS WILLIAM HEYCK & MEREDITH VELDMAN, THE PEOPLES OF THE BRITISH
ISLES: A NEW HISTORY FROM 1688 TO THE PRESENT 47-49 (2014), http://lyceumbooks.com/
pdf/PeoplesBritishslesllChapter_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YW6-HNNT]. Heyck and Veld-
man explain:
The key feature of eighteenth-century English society was that it was arranged as a
status hierarchy . . . . Gentle status was defined as the ability to live well without
working for a living, or, as the novelist Daniel Defoe put it, gentlemen were "such
who live on estates, and without the mechanism of employment."
Id.
160 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("The Congress shall have power to declare the Punish-
ment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture
except during the Life of the Person attained.").
61 See Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 117 ("[N]o conviction or judgment for
any of the offences aforesaid, shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate.").
Forfeiture of estate remained consigned to dustbins of history until the PATRIOT Act revived
the concept over two hundred years later, allowing forfeiture of estate for anyone "engaged in
planning or perpetrating any . . . Federal crime of terrorism." 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G)(i)
(2012); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2012). Although, it has been invoked only rarely,
if ever. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-139 A, CRIME AND FORFEITURE 1, 3-4
n.16 (2007) ("At least to date [May 9, 2007], this authority has rarely, if ever, been used.").
Department of Justice reluctance to invoke this provision of the PATRIOT Act, is not surpris-
ing given its dubious constitutionality.
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bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."'62
Beth Colgan has made a sweeping case for a reinterpretation of the
Excessive Fines Clause, suggesting that its application should consider "the
facts of a particular offense, the characteristics of a particular offender,
[and] the effects of the fine on the defendant."l63 Her review of the histori-
cal record suggests that he spirit of the Eighth Amendment "resounds with
quite remarkable humanity and pragmatism" and that the government
"should recognize the practical consequences of imposing fines on individu-
als and their families, and should not impoverish even those who have com-
mitted crimes."M
With few exceptions, American courts have not, however, embraced
this principle in the application of Excessive Fines jurisprudence. In most
circuits, the gross proportionality determination is the end of the analysis.165
In the majority opinion in Bajakajian, Justice Thomas quoted the Magna
Carta language that fines "should be proportioned to the offense and that
they should not deprive the wrongdoer of his livelihood,"'6 but went no
further with the issue, presumably because the claimant "d[id] not argue
that his wealth or income are relevant to the proportionality determination or
that full forfeiture would deprive him of his livelihood."'6 And most circuits
have declined to consider such factors.
The First Circuit presents a notable exception. In United States v.
Jose'68 and United States v. Levesque,169 it adopted an approach to Excessive
Fines that follows the proportionality assessment with a subsequent analysis
examining whether the forfeiture would result in a destruction of the prop-
erty owner's livelihood. Jose derived this conclusion from the history, quot-
ing Justice Thomas's discussion of the issue in the context of the English Bill
of Rights and Magna Carta in Bajakajian: "Given the history behind the
Excessive Fines Clause, it is appropriate to consider whether the forfeiture in
question would deprive Jose of his livelihood." 7 0
In Levesque, the district court had refused to "delve into . . . [the]
defendant's personal finances,"'7' but the court of appeals vacated and re-
162 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
163 Colgan, supra note 19, at 333-34.
i6 Id. at 350.
165 See, e.g. United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Castello, 611 F.3d 116, 120-21 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 418
(4th Cir. 2001).
1- 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998).
1 6 7 Id. at 340 n.15.
16 499 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2007).
169 546 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2008) ("Beyond the three factors described in Heldeman, a
court should also consider whether forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his or her liveli-
hood."); see also Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 340 n.15 (noting the failure of respondent to argue
the issue of loss of livelihood). The Ninth Circuit has suggested that i will consider "depriva-
tion of livelihood" in its analysis as well. See United States v. Hantzis, 403 F. App'x 170, 172
(9th Cir. 2010).
170499 F.3d at 113.
171 546 F.3d at 83.
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manded for consideration of whether the forfeiture "effectively would de-
prive the defendant of his or her livelihood."l 72 The court observed that the
deprivation of livelihood issue "is separate from the ... test for gross dispro-
portionality and may require factual findings beyond those previously made
by the district court."l 73 Thus, in the First Circuit, a fine that is not grossly
disproportional may still be excessive for a given individual where that for-
feiture would deprive the individual of his or her livelihood.174 Only if a
given forfeiture passes the grossly disproportional test and preserves the
property owner's livelihood can the forfeiture be upheld as constitutional in
the First Circuit.17 5
The Ninth Circuit has suggested that i may consider this factor as well.
In United States v. Hantzis, the Court cited Bajakajian's Magna Carta refer-
ence and upheld the forfeiture, in part because the claimant "was very
wealthy, and as he refused to submit a financial affidavit, there was no evi-
dence that a fine would 'deprive him of his livelihood.' "176 The Ninth Circuit
has yet to specifically hold, however, that deprivation of livelihood would
render an otherwise permissible fine excessive under the Eighth Amend-
ment, or that it would be error to ignore the claimant's personal financial
circumstances.
The Eleventh Circuit, in contrast, has expressly rejected any analysis of
the effect on the individual's livelihood, creating a split between the cir-
cuits.'7 Most circuits have not addressed this issue directly, although many
have articulated tests for excessiveness, listing factors to be considered that
omit any mention of deprivation of livelihood.178
It remains to be seen how this issue will resolve itself in the federal
courts. The historical record reveals, however, considerable basis to argue
that deprivation of livelihood and, arguably, ability to pay, should be critical
factors in a complete Excessive Fines analysis.
172 
Id. at 84.
173 Id. at 85.
174 
Id. at 83.
17 Id.; see also United States v. Aguasvivas-Castillo, 668 F.3d 7, 16 (Ist Cir. 2012).
176 See 403 F. App'x 170, 172 (9th Cir. 2010).
1
7 7 See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.Il (11th Cir. 1999) ("More impor-
tant, we do not take into account the personal impact of a forfeiture on the specific defendant
in determining whether the forfeiture violates the Eighth Amendment."); see also McLean,
supra note 19, at 835 (arguing that the failure of other circuits to adopt a livelihood analysis
"is both inequitable and ahistorical").
178 See, e.g., United States v. Wagoner Cty. Real Estate, 278 F.3d 1091, 1101 (10th Cir.
2002) (employing a nine-factor test for the Excessive Fines Clause, without mention of pre-
serving the claimant's livelihood or of her ability to pay); United States v. Haleamau, 887 F.
Supp. 2d 1051, 1065 (D. Haw. 2012) (applying a four-factor grossly disproportionate test that
included "'(1) the nature and extent of the crime, (2) whether the violation was related to other
illegal activities, (3) the other penalties that may be imposed for the violation, and (4) the
extent of the harm caused' (quoting United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d
1110, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004))).
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Ill. CONTRASTING APPROACH To FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (DUE
PROCESS) STANDARDS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The Court in Bajakajian needed to articulate some standard for what
constitutes an "excessive fine" under the Eighth Amendment, and under-
standably turned to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause jurisprudence
for guidance.7 9 After all, the clauses appear next to each other in the same
amendment.s0 But for a variety of reasons, the constitutional limits on puni-
tive damages, under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
provide a far more compelling parallel.
In Browning-Ferris, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment did not apply to punitive damages.s' A punitive damages award could
not violate the Eighth Amendment, because the damages are not paid to the
sovereign, and therefore could not be construed as a fine, excessive or other-
wise.182 A forfeiture, in contrast, typically is paid to the sovereign, which is
why it is subject to Eight Amendment analysis.'
This fundamental difference is dispositive in terms of Eighth Amend-
ment application. However, punitive damages and forfeitures-at least those
forfeitures intended to be punitive, which are the only ones the Eighth
Amendment covers-are strikingly similar. Both are designed for a punitive
purpose (deterrence and/or retribution) but operate outside of the criminal
law context; both are available over and above any criminal penalties that
may be imposed for the same conduct; and both are financial in their impact
and can therefore be measured in quantitative (dollar) terms. It is therefore
instructive to track the Supreme Court's treatment of punitive damages if we
are looking for a logical constitutional analogue for forfeitures.
BMW v. Gore was a watershed moment for punitive damages, as the
Supreme Court held for the first time that a punitive damages award could
be so disproportionately high as to violate the defendant's due process
rights.'" To analyze the constitutionality of an award of punitive damages,
the Supreme Court articulated three guideposts, or factors: (1) the reprehen-
sibility of the conduct, (2) the ratio between the amount of compensatory
damages and the amount of punitive damages awarded in the case, and (3)
'" See 524 U.S. 321, 336 (1998).
'See U.S. CONsT., amend. VIII.
' See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco, 492 U.S. 257, 259 (1989).
182 See id. at 265. But see Colgan, supra note 19, at 300-11 (noting a very long history in
English and American law in which fines were imposed that did not go to the sovereign).
'11 See United States v. Austin, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) ("We therefore conclude that
forfeiture under these provisions constitutes payment to a sovereign as punishment for some
offense and, as such, is subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
'" See 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996).
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the fines and civil penalties already prescribed for the tortious behavior that
prompted the award."s'
Seven years later, the BMW v. Gore rubric was reaffirmed and clarified
in State Farm v. Campbell.'"' Of particular interest was Campbell's discus-
sion of BMW v. Gore's guidepost Number 2, the ratio between the compen-
satory damages and punitive damages. Specifically, the Court observed that
a 4:1 ratio should normally withstand constitutional scrutiny, but few awards
with ratios in the double digits (i.e. 10:1 or greater) would be justified under
the Due Process clause.' On the other hand, the Court observed that in
some cases, even a 1:1 ratio may be too much if the compensatory damages
are high, or if the compensatory damages already include a punitive
element.'8
State Farm and Gore have generated considerable comment and contro-
versy, and the impact of these decisions has been hotly debated.' Empirical
study indicates that the ratios uggested by the Supreme Court have had a
marked impact on the range of punitive damages awards.'"' The result has
183 See id. at 560-61. A plurality opinion in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp.,
decided before BMW v. Gore, suggested that potential harm was relevant to assessing the
constitutionality of the punitive damage award; it was not necessary that the harm actually
occur and the compensatory damages actually accrue. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 459. About a
quarter of the courts explicitly apply the potential harm baseline suggested by TXO. See Laura
J. Hines & N. William Hines, Constitutional Constraints on Punitive Damages; Clarity, Con-
sistency, and the Outlier Dilemma, 66 HASTINGs L.J. 1257 (2015).
186 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003).
1" See id. at 425. The decision also identifies exceptions where the ratios may not be so
compelling, including cases in which (1) particularly egregious acts result in small economic
dangers, (2) injuries are difficult to detect, or (3) the value of non-economic harm is hard to
detect. See id. at 410.
"1 See id. (citing "cases involving outrage or humiliation" as ones that already include a
punitive element).
189 See, e.g., Heather R. Klaassen, Punishment Defanged: How the United States Supreme
Court Has Undermined the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Punitive Damages, WASHBURN
L.J. 551, 555-57 (2008) (criticizing State Farm v. Campbell stating the decision "threaten[s]
to undermine the historic value of punitive damages as a remedy by which to punish a particu-
lar defendant for particular conduct"); Steven R. Salbu, Developing Rational Punitive Dam-
ages Policies: Beyond the Constitution, 49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 292-96 (1997) (criticizing the
idea of calculating punitive damages as a multiple of compensatory damages due to difference
in policy objectives between the two sets of damages). But see, e.g., Garrett T. Charon, Note,
Beyond a Bar of Double-Digit Ratios: State Farm v. Campbell's Impact on Punitive Damages
Awards, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 621-23 (2005) (arguing that State Farm v. Campbell is
necessary to cure the many problems remaining after BMW v. Gore and is the best available
method to protect a defendant's due process rights while carefully avoiding excessive interfer-
ence with states' rights and legitimate interests); Daniel F. Thomas, Necessary Protection: An
Examination of the State Farm v. Campbell Standard and Why Economically Efficient Rules
Do Not Work at the Intersection Between Due Process and Punitive Damages, 70 ALB. L.
REv. 367, 385-97 (noting the many benefits of State Farm v. Campbell and dismissing the
primary criticisms of the decision).
' For example, the median of punitive damages awards across seventeen categories of
cases has, since. State Farm v. Campbell, gone down to below a 4:1 ratio. Hines & Hines,
supra note 185, at 1288. While trial courts have allowed punitive damages in a ratio over 10:1
in thirty-nine percent of their cases, the appellate courts-presumably applying Campbell-
have reduced more than half of those awards, bringing the total percentage over that ratio
down to nineteen percent. Id. at 1289.
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brought some consistency and predictability to the awards of punitive dam-
ages in the lower courts, because defense lawyers have some numbers to
argue in court, and judges have a rubric to use in assessing these punitive
damage awards.191 While no one advocates strict mathematical tests, the
State Farm formulae give the parties a basis for arguing the excessiveness
issue, and give the courts a basis for evaluating such arguments. Judges or
courts whose views of these matters are outliers on either end of the spec-
trum benefit enormously from the establishment of a presumptive range; ex-
pectations are clearer, and they can bring their judgments more in line with
fellow courts' rulings in comparable cases.192 At the same time, the predict-
ability of the punitive damages award strongly promotes settlements, as the
likely consequences of going to trial, for both parties, are more clearly
spelled out.
IV. PRACTICAL STANDARDS AND TOOLS FOR ANALYZING
THE ExCESSIVE FINES IssuE
The Supreme Court's reliance on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
jurisprudence to articulate a standard for the Excessive Fines Clause is de-
cidedly unhelpful in creating a meaningful precedent or in guiding lower
courts and law enforcement on how to handle contested forfeitures. We
know now that a forfeiture, if even partially punitive, can violate the Exces-
sive Fines Clause, but only if it is "grossly disproportional" to the gravity of
the offense,9 3 terms only marginally more objective or meaningful, in the
context of a forfeiture, than the word "excessive."
The issue of what is punitive remains somewhat murky, given the cir-
cuit courts' split over whether and when proceeds forfeitures can fall into
this category, as well as the inconsistent messages from the Supreme Court
about civil in rem forfeitures." But the most serious problem lies in the
application of the "grossly disproportional" standard, articulated in
Bajakajian, in Excessive Fines cases.
The troubled history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
should put one on notice that the "grossly disproportional" standard is diffi-
cult to apply. The Supreme Court has had to revisit, reformulate and apply
the rule again and again, handing down a series of problematic decisions
applying that clause over the past century.'9 5 If the Supreme Court could
'9' See id. at 1289.
19 Some have argued, of course, that consistency in the court decisions is not a salutary
goal. If each case must be decided on its own facts, and each case is different, there is no
reason to believe that punitive damage awards in dissimilar cases should be similar.
9 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
194 See discussion of the tension between Austin and Bajakajian, highlighted by the dissent
in Bajakajian and by the Eighth Circuit in Lippert, supra notes 140-44. A more thorough
explanation of the question of whether and when a forfeiture should be considered even par-
tially punitive is a subject for another article.
195 See generally Stinneford, supra note 26.
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have found a brighter line or a more workable standard for those cases, per-
haps the litigation and the ongoing controversies could have been limited. It
would be very difficult to define bright lines or workable standards for mea-
suring cruelty, of course. But because fines are easily quantified, there is
great potential for a more practical test, even a formula, to assess the exces-
siveness of fines. The "grossly disproportional" standard may have been the
best the Supreme Court could o for Cruel and Unusual Punishment, but it is
a particularly unpromising standard to rely upon if the Court hopes to bring
coherence to the Excessive Fines case law.
A. Finding Better Guidance in the Punitive Damages Cases
1. The Three-Factor Test and Mathematical Formulae
What is needed still is a formula, an analytical rubric, that trial courts
can follow in analyzing the constitutionality of a forfeiture. It is not neces-
sary to reject the "grossly disproportional" standard in developing this
formula. The formula can simply provide a structure for assessing what is,
and what is not, grossly disproportional. The State Farm three-factor formula
for punitive damages is drawn in terms of ratios, and indeed, ratios are noth-
ing more or less than a measure of proportionality. As articulated above, the
formula for punitive damages may provide a useful guide for the creation of
a formula for excessive fines.
2. Distinctions Between Forfeitures and Punitive Damages
Note, however, that the scenarios giving rise to excessive forfeitures are
actually far more problematic than the scenarios giving rise to excessive
punitive damages. Punitive damages are assessed when and precisely be-
cause compensatory damages are inadequate deterrence for reprehensible
conduct,'" and the punitive damages are an attempt to impose a more appro-
priate level of deterrence and retribution.197 The constitutional protection
against excessive punitive damages requires courts to determine how much
punishment is too much, even as finders of fact attempt to determine and
impose an appropriate level of punishment for the tortious behavior.
Forfeitures, in contrast, are typically assessed completely without refer-
ence to the seriousness of the crime, or to how much punishment is appropri-
' David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39
ViL. L. REV. 363, 377 (1994).
197 See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages may be prop-
erly imposed to further a State's legitimate interest in punishing unlawful conduct and deter-
ring its repetition"); Owen, supra note 196, at 375; Leila C. Orr, Making A Case for Wealth-
Calibrated Punitive Damages, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1739, 1747 (2004) ("A fundamental basis
for punitive damages is to provide retribution to the victim of an aggravated wrong.").
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ate, but only according to the value of the property declared forfeitable.1 98
Because the amount of the forfeiture is set without reference to culpability
and determined by factors entirely unrelated to the appropriate level of pun-
ishment, there is far greater risk that the forfeiture will be somehow dispro-
portionate. In the forfeiture situation, therefore, disproportionality should be
expected, so one might argue that forfeitures should be subjected to a more
exacting constitutional scrutiny than punitive damages.'99
3. Applying the Three-Factor Test to Forfeitures
The test set forth by the Supreme Court involves consideration of three
factors: (i) the reprehensibility of the conduct, (ii) the ratio between the com-
pensatory damages and the punitive damages awarded, and (iii) the civil
penalties for comparable conduct.200 Consideration of these three factors
sheds light on the question of excessiveness in the forfeitures context as
well.
Certainly, the reprehensibility of the conduct (guidepost Number 1 in
the State Farm/BMW test) should be considered in assessing the excessive-
ness of a forfeiture, and the Court has already held as much by applying the
"grossly disproportional" standard with reference to the "gravity" of the
underlying offense.2 01
The ratio between the compensatory damages and the punitive damages
awarded in the case (guidepost Number 2 in the State Farm/BMW test) has
no analogue in the area of forfeitures, because the amount of harm done (the
amount necessary to compensate victims for their losses) is not measured or
otherwise a factor in the forfeiture proceeding or in the underlying criminal
action. Thus, there is no baseline from which to calculate a ratio.
The civil penalties for comparable conduct (guidepost Number 3 of the
State Farm/BMW test), however, does find an analogue in the criminal pen-
alties specified for the crime that prompted the forfeiture. And it is here that
we find great potential for a meaningful formula. Prescriptions for criminal
punishments can be found in criminal statutes as well as in the applicable
198 The value of the assets used to commit a crime are unlikely to have any bearing on the
seriousness of a crime. An assault committed with an axe is likely to be just as blameworthy, if
not more so, than one conducted with sophisticated (and expensive) weaponry. Relatively mi-
nor crimes, such as reckless driving, may be committed with extremely expensive vehicles.
See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 42 ("Someone who completes a drug deal in his own $20,000
car will suffer the criminal penalty plus an additional $20,000 'fine' in the form of the forfei-
ture of the car. The person who completes the same drug deal in the back of a taxi gets the
same criminal penalty, but without the $20,000 fine. This disparity in punishment is difficult,
if not impossible, to justify.") (citations omitted).
' The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause provides no better parallel, as it too is
applied against punitive determinations made by a trial court, second-guessing the trial court's
imposition of a punishment designed to fit the crime. Again, the amount of the forfeiture is
typically determined entirely without reference to the severity of the crime. See id.
2 See State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 409 (2003); BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 560.
201 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998).
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Sentencing Guidelines, the latter providing a particularly meaningful base-
line for a proportionality analysis.
a. Statutory Fines
It may be tempting to rely on statutorily prescribed fines for this gui-
dance, but there are compelling reasons that these may be the wrong guide-
posts to rely on. The United States Criminal Code articulates the maximum
fines that can be imposed, specifying generally that the fine for felony shall
be "not more than $250,000," the fine for a Class A misdemeanor "not
more than $100,000," and the fine for Class B and C misdemeanors "not
more than $5,000."202 These figures are decidedly unhelpful guideposts for
calibrating fines (or limits on forfeitures) that are "proportional," as all felo-
nies are lumped together with the same fine limit.
Some statutes are more specific about fine limits, such as the statute
making it a crime to obstruct access to reproductive health clinics. 203 It ex-
plicitly exempts itself from the Section 3571 limits set forth above, and pro-
vides that:
for an offense involving exclusively a nonviolent physical obstruc-
tion, the fine shall be not more than $10,000 and the length of
imprisonment shall be not more than six months, or both, for the
first offense; and the fine shall, notwithstanding section 3571, be
not more than $25,000 and the length of imprisonment shall be not
more than 18 months, or both, for a subsequent offense .... .04
The $10,000 and $25,000 fines prescribed in this statute may be far
more useful as guideposts for a constitutional proportionality assessment.
Someone who parks a car in such a way as to block the entrance to such a
clinic may be subject to forfeiture of the car, in which case the $10,000 and
$25,000 limits might be useful in assessing the proportionality of the forfei-
ture under the Eighth Amendment. Some of these statutes may be old, how-
ever, and if they reflect currency values unadjusted for inflation, that would
undermine their reliability as proportionality guideposts.2 05 But most, if they
specify maximum fines at all, fail to exempt themselves from Section
2"See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b) (2012).
203 See 18 U.S.C. § 248.
2" See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b).
205 18 U.S.C. § 35(a) (specifying a fine of no more than $1,000 for knowingly conveying
false information in relation to aircraft/motor vehicle/railway/shipping crime, a fine set in the
original 1956 legislation and never updated).
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357 1206 and are therefore superseded by the rough figures set forth in Section
3571.207
The fact that the statute authorized fines up to $250,000 was decidedly
unpersuasive to the Court in Bajakajian:
Here, as the Government and the dissent stress, Congress author-
ized a maximum fine of $250,000 plus five years' imprisonment
for willfully violating the statutory reporting requirement, and this
suggests that it did not view the reporting offense as a trivial one.
That the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to which respon-
dent was subject were but a fraction of the penalties authorized,
however, undercuts any argument based solely on the statute, be-
cause they show that respondent's culpability relative to other po-
tential violators of the reporting provision-tax evaders, drug
kingpins, or money launderers, for example-is small indeed.0
While "other penalties that the Legislature has authorized are certainly rele-
vant evidence," 209 those penalties were not at all meaningful in this case.
Moreover, they are unlikely to illuminate the issue much in many other
cases, as long as Congress applies a blanket $250,000 limit to all felonies
alike.
b. The Sentencing Guidelines' Fine Table
A more promising source is the Sentencing Guidelines, which are cali-
brated to identify appropriate and proportional penalties for criminal con-
duct.2 10 Just as punitive damages may be imposed over and above such civil
penalties, the courts have made it clear that forfeitures may be assessed over
and above any criminal punishment.211 Whatever fine the Sentencing Guide-
lines prescribe for the conduct the claimant engaged in should be strongly
indicative of what may be a proportional punishment for purposes of the
Eighth Amendment.
206 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1644(f) (specifying a $10,000 fine for fraudulent use of a credit
card); ELLEN ALLRED & DENNIS JOINER, FED. PuB. DEF., MAXIMUM PENALTIES TITLE 18
CRIMES AND OTHER SELECTED STATES (2015), http://ms.fd.org/maxpenalties/maxpenalties.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75PZ-5GCW] (noting that 15 U.S.C. § 1644(f) fails to exempt itself from
Section 3571, so the maximum fine is actually $250,000, the same fine as for homicide
offenses).
2" See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(e) ("If a law setting forth an offense specifies no fine or a fine
that is lower than the fine otherwise applicable under this section and such law, by specific
reference, exempts the offense from the applicability of the fine otherwise applicable under
this section, the defendant may not be fined more than the amount specified in the law setting
forth the offense").
20 524 U.S. 321, 339 n.14 (1998).
209Id
2 0
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
211 See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 270-71 (1996) (holding that there was
no double-jeopardy violation in a criminal prosecution for a drug crime when a separate forfei-
ture proceeding against the defendant's house, arising out of the same crime, was already
pending).
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The United States Sentencing Guidelines, of course, include a fine table
of their own, one that gives a better breakdown of fine ranges for offenses of
varying degrees of gravity.



















38 and above $50,000 $500,000.
Because the Sentencing Commission is not part of the legislative branch-
and not politicized in any significant way-reliance on this table neatly
avoids the separation of powers problem.213 The Sentencing Commission de-
votes meticulous attention to the categorization of crimes into an array of
offense levels, ranging from one to forty-three, all with an eye toward "pro-
portionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately dif-
ferent sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity."214
It is not surprising, therefore, that numerous federal courts have relied
on this fine table as a reference point for determining whether the corre-
sponding forfeiture is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.215
But there is no formula and no consensus approach to how to use the infor-
212 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
213 See discussion supra note 151.
214U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015).
215 See, e.g., United States v. Beecroft, 825 F.3d 991, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2016) (striking
down a forfeiture of $107 million because the maximum fine prescribed by the fines table was
$1 million); United States v. Browne, 505 F.3d 1229, 1282 (1lth Cir. 2007) (upholding a
forfeiture, in part, because the forfeiture "was significantly less than the maximum fine allow-
able under the Guidelines").
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mation in the Sentencing Guidelines' Fine Table ("Fine Table"). Bajakajian
held that the forfeiture was an excessive fine when the forfeiture was about
seventy-one times higher than the maximum fine provided in the Sentencing
Guidelines.2 16 The Ninth Circuit has also rejected forfeitures valued at an
amount between three and twenty times the Guidelines' maximum,2 17 and
another where the forfeiture was "more than 40 times the maximum permit-
ted under the Guidelines."218 Other courts have upheld forfeitures that ex-
ceeded the Fine Table's maximum, as long as they didn't exceed the Fine
Table's maximum by too much.219
At the same time, the Fine Table lumps offense levels together and then
prescribes a wide range of sentences (a range that spans a full order of mag-
nitude) for each cluster. For example, most of the offense categories call for
a range where the maximum fine exceeds the minimum fine by a factor of
ten, and the more minor offenses offer an even wider range.220 If $200 may
be an appropriate fine for a particular Level 1 offense, it is difficult to imag-
ine that a forfeiture, in the same case, of $9,500-forty-seven times higher
than the $200 fine warranted by the facts-would not be excessive, but the
Fine Table would not flag that as a disproportionate amount.2 1 As a result,
the Fine Table may give only the most limited guidance to lower courts
struggling to determine whether a forfeiture is "grossly disproportional" or
not.
c. The Sentencing Guidelines for Months of Imprisonment
Unlike the Fine Table, the Sentencing Guidelines for imprisonment are
extremely helpful in breaking down various offenses, and offenders, to pre-
scribe proportional punishments. Unlike the Fine Table, they do not lump
offense levels together; moreover, within each offense level, they further
subdivide the sentences according to the criminal history of the offender.
The range of sentences within each cell is a far cry from the 1:10 ranges we
see in the Fine Table. For a first-time offender committing a Level 15 of-
fense, for example, the Fine Table prescribes a fine of $7,500-$75,000 (a
216 United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326, 339-40 (1998).
217 See United States v. $100,348.00 in U.S. Currency, 354 F.3d 1110, 1123 (9th Cir.
2004).
218 United States v. 3814 NW Thurman St., 164 F.3d 1191, 1198 (9th Cir. 1999).
29 See e.g., United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 418 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding a
$1,200,000 forfeiture, in part, because it was only 2.4 times the fine table's maximum allowa-
ble fine of $500,000).
220 Offenses rated at level 3 or below bring fines that range from $200 to $9,500. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(c)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015). The Fine
Table also allows fines exceeding these stated maxima if the statute specifies a higher fine
range. Id. § 5E1.2(c)(4).
221 Id. § 5E1.2(c)(3). The same argument could be made here that Justice Thomas made
about statutorily set fines in Bajakajian: "That the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to
which respondent was subject were but a fraction of the penalties authorized, however, under-
cuts any argument based solely on the statute, because they show that respondent's culpability
relative to other potential violators of the reporting provision ... is small indeed." 524 U.S. at
339 n.14.
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1:10 ratio), while the imprisonment guideline is 18-24 months (a 1:1.33 ra-
tio). A defendant with a long rap sheet (in Criminal History Category VI),
committing the same crime yields the same answer on the Fine Table,
$7,500-$75,000, a 1:10 ratio), but an imprisonment sentence of 41-51
months (approximately a 1:1.25 ratio). Not only are the imprisonment guide-
lines sensitive to the difference between a first-time offender and a serious
recidivist, they also prescribe a relatively narrow range of permissible
sentences for each of them.
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TABLE 2: SENTENCING BY CRIMINAL HISTORY 222
SENTENCING TABLE














































Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
I II Ill IV V VI
(0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4,5,6) (7,8,9) (10,11, 12) (13 or more)
0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6
0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 1-7
0-6 0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 3-9
0-6 0-6 0-6 2-8 4-10 6-12
0-6 0-6 1-7 4-10 6-12 9-15
0-6 1-7 2-8 6-12 9-15 12-18
0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
0-6 4-10 6-12 10-16 15-21 18-24
4-10 6-12 8-14 12-18 18-24 21-27
6-12 -14 10-16 15-21 21-27 24-30
- 10-16 - 18-24 24-30 27-33
10-16 12-18 15-21 21-27 27-33 30-37
12-18 15-21 18-24 24-30 30-37 33-41
15-21 18-24 21-27 27-33 33-41 37-46
18-24 21-27 24-30 30-37 37-46 41-51
21-27 24-30 27-33 33-41 41-51 46-57
24-30 27-33 30-37 37-46 46-57 51-63
27-33 30-37 33-41 41-51 51-63 57-71
30-37 33-41 37-46 46-57 57-71 63-78
33-41 37-46 41-51 51-63 63-78 70-87
37-46 41-51 46-57 57-71 70-87 77-96
41-51 46-57 51-63 63-78 77-96 84-105
46-57 51-63 57-71 70-87 84-105 92-115
































































































There is little question, therefore, that the imprisonment guidelines are
far more sensitive to differences in the gravity of offenses, and therefore, far
222 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 404 (U.S. SENTENCING COMMN 2015).
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more instructive on what penalties might be proportional (or disproportional)
to them in the context of the Eighth Amendment.223
B. A Proposed Formula
The challenge, then, is to find a way to translate the "months of impris-
onment" guidelines into monetary figures that would be meaningful in as-
sessing the constitutionality of a fine or forfeiture under the Eighth
Amendment. Such a formula could give the reviewing court a starting point
for such analysis, a guidepost that is far more meaningful than anything the
courts are using now.
The answer is simpler than it might seem. One might, for example,
establish a presumptive forfeiture limit equal to $1,500 per month of permis-
sible imprisonment.224 So if a person has committed a crime punishable by
up to six months in prison, the maximum amount of forfeiture he or she
could be subjected to would be $9,000 (six months multiplied by $1,500/
month); at least, there would be a legal presumption of constitutionality of
any forfeiture up to $9,000. If the government sought to forfeit more value
than that, the government would bear the burden of establishing that such
forfeiture was not grossly disproportional, and that it was therefore constitu-
tional under the Excessive Fines Clause.
The Supreme Court could certainly adopt a different formula (other
than one month = $1,500), but the Sentencing Guidelines seem to suggest
this is an appropriate figure to use. For example, the full range of low-level
offenses (including Offense Level 1 at the highest Criminal History category
up to Offense Level 7 at the lowest Criminal History category) are punisha-
ble by up to six months in prison and subject to fines up to $9,500 (on the
Fine Table). Thus the $1,500 per month formula does a good job of approxi-
mating (at $9,000) the separately established fine limit ($9,500) for these
same cases. The highest level offenses contain similar ratios, as Offense
Level 38, for a first offense, carries a punishment of 235 to 293 months, and
is subject to fines up to $500,000 (on the Fines Table), giving a value of
$439,500 (293 months multiplied by $1,500/month) maximum fine. The ra-
tio of $1,500 per month is, therefore, reflected roughly in the Sentencing
Guidelines already.
223 See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 54 n.306 (suggesting a formula that would translate
months of imprisonment into a monetary figure in assessing the excessiveness of a civil forfei-
ture under the 8th Amendment); see also Solomon, supra note 19, at 877 (noting that the court
in Bajakajian "could have suggested a rough baseline-perhaps the maximum allowable fines
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines-to assure some semblance of uniformity and fair-
ness in future cases").
224 A rough example of this approach was proposed, using the figure $1000 per month, in
a footnote in Pimentel, supra note 10, at 54 n.306. Since that publication, the Fine Table has
been amended, and the $1,500 per month figure aligns far more closely with the new Fine
Table. See infra the next paragraph for an explanation.
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TABLE 3: SENTENCING TABLE (MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT & MONTHS
MULTIPLIED BY $1,500/MONTH.)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
V VIOffense I II .III IV ( , 1
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10,11, (13 or
12) more)
0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
7 $0-9000 $3000- $6000- $12,000- $18,000- $22,500-
12,000 15,000 21,000 27,000 31,500
235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
38 $352,500- $393,000- $438,000- $486,000- $540,000- $540,000-
439,500 490,500 547,500 607,500
This formula, like the ratios posited in State Farm v. Campbell, would
give trial courts a starting point and a frame of reference for evaluating the
constitutionality of a forfeiture under the Excessive Fines Clause.22 5
1. Application of the Formula
a. Identifying the Crime and the Criminal with Specificity
The formula should be quite straightforward to apply. Any time there is
a criminal prosecution and sentencing, the application of the sentencing
guidelines will have been done already anyway. It is a simple matter to take
the maximum sentence prescribed for that crime (and that offender) and
multiply the months by $1,500 to determine the maximum fine that can en-
joy a presumption of constitutionality. If the value of the forfeited property
exceeds that amount, the constitutional question is raised, and the govern-
ment must justify it under Eighth Amendment standards. Meanwhile, the
court has a pretty clear idea, from a separate, objective source, as to the
permissible range of forfeitures arising out of that particular offense.
Of course, if no criminal prosecution is brought, the government will
still have to justify the forfeiture with respect to some crime in any case.
Facilitating property forfeitures have always required that the government
show that a crime was committed. Accordingly, the proposed formula may
require the government to demonstrate with greater specificity exactly what
crime was committed, as well as the culpability of the owner for that crime
(including the criminal history of the owner, for purposes of Sentencing
Guidelines application).
While the government is likely to complain about the costs and burdens
associated with making such a showing, those burdens are likely to serve as
223 See 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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a meaningful check on government overreaching.226 Increasing the transac-
tion costs of forfeitures may be exactly what is needed to curb the too-quick
and too-easy seizures of property that are going on now.w7 The small-value
forfeiture is particularly vulnerable to abuse because any instance is likely to
go unchallenged. If the government cannot show with any specificity what
crime it believes was committed and does not have evidence to substantiate
it, the forfeiture itself should be suspect. Those are precisely the cases of
government overreaching that should be reined in, and imposing that type of
burden or cost on the government's seizure will discourage the government
from making the dubious seizures in the first place.
In the case of forfeitures attempted when the government declines to
prosecute at all, the application of the formula may require some kind of
presentence report, akin to that prepared by the court's probation and pretrial
departments before a sentencing hearing, so the culpability of the owner
under the Sentencing Guidelines can be established. No doubt the prosecu-
tion would object to bearing this burden, but the prospect of imposing a
serious forfeiture (i.e. a fine) without first establishing the owner's culpabil-
ity would seem to offend the Eighth Amendment in any case.
b. Innocent (and Mildly Culpable) Owners
Finally, the formula should, as a matter of fundamental fairness to the
property owner and consistent with Eighth Amendment requirements, be
tied to the crime committed by the owner, not a crime committed by a third
party. If the owner is, in fact, innocent (as was the case in both Bennis and
Goldsmith-Grant), the formula suggests that any forfeiture that is more than
de minimis would be disproportional. An innocent party is subject a maxi-
mum of zero months of imprisonment, and the maximum forfeiture that
could be upheld under the Eighth Amendment herefore would similarly be
zero (0 multiplied by $1,500 equals 0). Again, the formula is only a starting
point for analysis, but it appropriately suggests that any forfeiture from an
innocent owner should require special scrutiny and special circumstances.
The Lopes case is also instructive, because the parents' culpability-
when their adult son planted marijuana in the back yard-was far less than
the son's.228 An application of the formula would require calculation of the
parents' relatively minor liability under the Sentencing Guidelines, with any
forfeiture limited to that number of months of incarceration times $1,500,
making it very difficult for the government to justify seizing their home.
Again, the formula would effectively afford Eighth Amendment protection
to people who would otherwise be subject to grossly disproportional
punishment.
226 This concept is explored by Michael Van Den Berg in a provocative article. See
Michael Van Den Berg, Proposing a Transaction Approach to Civil Forfeiture Reform, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 867, 913-23 (2015).
227 See id.
228 See Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 1.
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2. Incorporating the Ability to Pay in the Formula
As noted above in Part II.E., some commentators and courts have ar-
gued persuasively that the definition of "excessive fine" should take into
account the wrongdoer's ability to pay, or at least the possibility that the fine
would be so ruinous as to deprive him of his livelihood. 9 This, of course, is
a core principle in the calculation of punitive damages already, a justifica-
tion for punitive damages set high enough to provide meaningful deterrence
of tortious behavior by this particular defendant.230
Moreover, the Sentencing Guidelines' Fine Table is followed by several
provisions urging that fines should be imposed with reference to such
factors:
(d) In determining the amount of the fine, the court shall consider:
(1) the need for the combined sentence to reflect the serious-
ness of the offense (including the harm or loss to the victim
and the gain to the defendant), to promote respect for the law,
to provide just punishment and to afford adequate deterrence;
(2) any evidence presented as to the defendant's ability to pay
the fine (including the ability to pay over a period of time) in
light of his earning capacity and financial resources;
(3) the burden that the fine places on the defendant and his
dependents relative to alternative punishments;
and
(8) any other pertinent equitable considerations.3 1
No court has adopted "ability to pay" per se as a factor to consider in
an Excessive Fines analysis. However, the First Circuit has demonstrated
consonant sensibilities by considering whether the forfeiture will result in
the deprivation of the claimant's livelihood,232 and the Ninth Circuit has
made a similar suggestion in one case.2 3 3 Colgan and McLean both argue
persuasively that the impact of the forfeiture on the individual-linked to the
deprivation of one's livelihood and the ability to pay-must be a part of the
229 See supra text accompanying notes 152-78.
2
1 See, e.g., Robert R. Caputi & Frank J. Faruolo Jr., Is Evidence of the Defendant's
Wealth Admissible When Punitive Damages Are Awarded in New York?, 21 ST. JOHN's L. REV.
198, 199 (1947) (noting that where a case has been made that warrants exemplary damages,
the majority of courts allow the pecuniary status of the defendant to be admitted to allow the
jury to determine the amount of punitive damages appropriate to punish the defendant).
231 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2(d) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015)
(emphasis added).
232 See United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d 78, 83-84 (1st Cir. 2008); see also discussion
supra notes 172-177.
233 See United States v. Hantzis, 403 F. App'x 170, 172 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying the
Excessive Fines Clause and finding there was "no evidence that a fine would 'deprive [the
appellant] of his livelihood"' (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335
(1998))).
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Excessive Fines analysis, and they seem to have the history of the clause on
their side.23 4 Supreme Court dictum in Bajakajian similarly draws on the
Magna Carta to acknowledge the concern about how ruinous the fine may
be.235 So we may yet see this aspect of the Excessive Fines analysis get full
and formal recognition in the courts.
If the courts agree that "ability to pay" should be considered, the pro-
posed formula is easily adjusted to reflect the concept. Someone with a typi-
cal income or assets may be limited to a forfeiture of $1,500 per month of
potential imprisonment (see above). But a wealthy individual might be able
to sustain a much larger forfeiture, with a formula tied to that person's in-
come, for example, before running afoul of the Eighth Amendment.
The $1,500 per month figure runs about one-third the median family
income in the United States ($4,471).236 Assuming that the Fines Table (with
which the $1,500 figure correlates) represents appropriate punishment for
the average American, we might amend our formula to utilize one-third of
the monthly income of this particular defendant instead of the standard
$1,500-per-month amount. It might be reasonable, therefore, to establish a
presumption that a forfeiture is not an excessive fine (and is constitutional
under the Eighth Amendment) if it calculates at one-third of that person's
monthly income times the number of months of imprisonment prescribed for
that person's crime. For example, a person who makes $12,000 per month
($144,000/year) and commits a crime punishable by six months in prison
could be constitutionally subject to a $24,000 forfeiture ($4,000 per month
multiplied by six months). By the same token, someone who earns only
$1,800 per month-i.e. someone living near the poverty line2 37-who com-
mits the same crime, might be subject to a forfeiture of no more than $3,600
($600 per month multiplied by six months) for that same crime before such
forfeiture loses the presumption of constitutionality.
23 See Colgan, supra note 19, at 345-47.
235 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335-36 (1998) (quoting Magna Carta, 9
Hen E, Ch. 14 (1225)).236 Tami Luhby, Typical American Family Earned $53,657 Last Year, CNN MONEY (Sept.
16, 2015), http://money.cnn.comi/2015/09/16/news/economy/census-poverty-income/ [https://
perma.cc/83UW-CAXZ].
237 The poverty line for a family of four is $2,025 per month. Health & Human Servs.
Poverty Guidelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 4036 (Jan. 25, 2016).
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TABLE 4: SENTENCING TABLE (MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT & MONTHS
MULTIPLIED BY $4,000/MONTH)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
Offense I II III IV V VI
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) (10, 11, 12) (13 or
more)
0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
7 $8000- $16000- $32000- $48000- $60000-
32000 40000 56000 72000 84000
235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
38 $940,000- $1,048,000- $1,168,000- $1,296,000- $1,440,000- $1,440,000-
1,172,000 1,308,000 1,460,000 1,620,000
TABLE 5: SENTENCING TABLE (MONTHS OF IMPRISONMENT & MONTHS
MULTIPLIED BY $600/MONTH)
Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
V VI
Offense I II III IV (10, 11 (13 or
Level (0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7, 8, 9) 12) more)
0-6 2-8 4-10 8-14 12-18 15-21
7 $1200- $2400- $4800- $7200- $9000-
4800 6000 8400 10800 12600
235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
38 $141,000- $157,200- $175,200- $194,400- $216,000- $216,000-
175,800 196,200 219,000 243,000
Of course, the cases have, to date, referred only to the figures on the
Sentencing Commission's Fine Table and found forfeitures to be excessive
fines when the forfeiture amounts to some multiple of the maximum fine
prescribed.2 3 8 A court might well decide that although the figure calculated
may be a proportional fine, even a disproportional fine may be constitu-
tional; after all, it is not excessive under the Eighth Amendment unless it is
grossly disproportional.39 One must recall that the forfeiture is on top of any
criminal penalties, so for a Level 7 first-time offense, a defendant may be
sentenced to serve six months' incarceration, fined $9,500, and subjected to
forfeiture on top of that.240 The Eighth Amendment comes to his aid only if
the fine is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense.241 The pro-
238 See, e.g., supra notes 214-16.
239 Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334.
2"See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2012) (stating that "[a] sanction authorized by section 3554
[forfeiture] . . . may be imposed in addition to the sentence" of imprisonment, fine or
probation).
241 A separate question arises when a criminal fine is assessed, with a forfeiture on top of
that. If the forfeiture is at least partly punitive, it will be subject to the Excessive Fines Clause,
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posed formula, generating the numbers depicted in the tables above, give at
least some basis for making such a determination, even if the Court were to
decide that the numbers it produces should be doubled or tripled before the
"grossly disproportional" threshold is crossed.242
There would be costs and burdens associated with evaluating the defen-
dant's ability to pay, of course. Impoverished people may not have good
financial records, and wealthier people will have incentives to conceal their
income and assets from the court.243 As Colgan observes, however, "[I]n the
vast majority of cases much of the relevant evidence would already be gath-
ered to assess indigency for Sixth Amendment purposes."244 And if the pri-
mary factor is monthly income, as suggested above, that should be easy to
determine with simple reference to tax returns in recent years.
Whether or not "ability to pay" is factored into the formula, formulae
like this one give district courts the practical tools they need to analyze Ex-
cessive Fines issues in forfeitures with confidence and consistency. They
will also guide law enforcement in the forfeitures they choose to pursue,
providing an important check on such actions, a check that is now missing
because so many of the forfeitures are unreviewed and even unreviewable in
the courts.245 The formula will not provide a new level of review, but it will
give law enforcement some standards to follow. Because courts can hold law
enforcement to these standards, the officers on the ground may be prompted
to check their own ambition in the seizure of assets.
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause can be an important
vehicle for reining in abusive forfeiture practices and ensuring that justice is
done in the forfeiture cases. But in order for the Excessive Fines Clause to
effectively serve this higher principle, the courts need a more practical and
workable approach to conducting the Excessive Fines analysis. Taking a
page from the Supreme Court's approach to punitive damages, the answer
may well lie in mathematical ratios or formulae. Such formulae could be tied
and arguably should be considered in conjunction with any criminal fine assessed for the same
offense. It is easy to imagine a criminal fine that is not excessive, and a forfeiture that standing
alone is not excessive, but when the fine and the forfeiture are added together, they pass the
constitutionally-defined threshold and violate the Eighth Amendment. It seems appropriate,
therefore, when considering fines for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause, to take into
account the combined total of criminal monetary penalties and forfeiture amounts.
242 See, e.g., United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 418 (4th Cir. 2001) (upholding a
forfeiture valued at 2.4 times the maximum amount allowed under the Fine Table).
243 Evidence would need to be introduced and evaluated, and potentially confusing data
would have to be sorted out, such as when an investor has extensive holdings but is highly
leveraged, so that her liabilities rival her assets, resulting perhaps in a negative cash flow.
244 Colgan, supra note 19, at 347 n.351 (assessing indigency by considering the defen-
dant's liquid assets, the household's net monthly income, and "basic living costs" including
"shelter, food, utilities, health care, transportation, clothing, education, and support payments"
(citing MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:10)).
245 See Pimentel, supra note 10, at 7.
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to sentencing guidelines, which incorporate key measures of the offenses'
gravity and generate presumptive limits on the forfeitures. A simple calcula-
tion could have revealed to prosecutors and to the court that the Lopes's
home was too great a forfeiture; the Eighth Amendment should have pro-
tected them, even if Fifth Amendment due process guarantees could not.
Presumptions-either for or against constitutionality of a particular forfei-
ture-can be overcome, of course, when surrounding circumstances dictate.
But a formula-based starting point will be a powerful force in meaningfully
and consistently effecting the Eighth Amendment's ideals of proportionality
in the troubled world of asset forfeitures.
